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HOW WILL TECHNOLOGY  
CHANGE THE FACE OF CHINESE JUSTICE? 
 
Benjamin Minhao Chen* & Zhiyu Li** 
 
The People’s Republic of China is embarking on an 
ambitious program to revolutionize its judicial institutions 
through information technology. Millions of cases have been 
published online as part of a move towards greater 
transparency. Courts are piloting artificial intelligence systems 
that promise to streamline adjudicatory processes and expand 
access to justice. Although other jurisdictions have employed 
statistical and computational methods to improve judicial 
decision-making, few have sought to exploit technology to the 
same degree. A way of understanding this exceptionalism is to 
view the integration of technology into law as a microcosm of 
China’s ambitions to emerge as a global artificial intelligence 
powerhouse and thereby establish itself in the first rank of 
nations. 
Seen from a different perspective, however, the 
technologization of the legal system responds to certain 
oppositions in Chinese justice. First, courts today are straining 
under the burden of their caseloads. The contemporary turn 
towards legality has swelled the number of lawsuits while the 
professionalization of the judicial corps also culled its ranks. 
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Artificial intelligence enhances the speed and consistency of 
adjudication while online disclosure cultivates public trust in the 
courts. Second, adherence to legal rules and forms restored 
normality to a society upended by revolutionary struggle but its 
inflexibility also foments dissatisfaction and disrupts 
relationships. The ensuing governmental imperative for judges 
to mediate disputes has resulted in coerced settlements and 
delayed verdicts. Machine predictions of case outcomes, 
supplied by courts, guide parties to bargain in the shadow of the 
law, thereby preserving the voluntariness of peace and the 
sanctity of justice. Third, while the party-state encourages 
citizens to know the law and use it as their weapon, civil society 
and activist lawyers may rally behind a legal cause to challenge 
the ideological hegemony of the party-state. By helping citizens 
learn the law and claim their rights, databases and applications 
foster legal consciousness while disintermediating lawyers.  
Technological initiatives for administering justice 
simply, swiftly, and singly have thus blossomed in China because 
they relieve some of the tensions in its legal system. An original 
survey of roughly a thousand netizens and interviews of over a 
hundred legal aid seekers suggest that internet and artificial 
intelligence technologies have the potential to realize and refine 
a Chinese brand of authoritarian legality. But there is also a 
larger insight here that transcends jurisdictional boundaries 
and legal cultures. Obverse to the democratization of law is the 
marginalization of the legal profession. The advent of 
technology thus surfaces a tension between two dimensions of 
legality. The first dimension sees law as the disciplining of 
human conduct through rules. The second dimension, on the 
other hand, conceives of law as a dynamic force that, by 
responding to reason, has the potential to reshape the normative 
status quo. To the extent that lawyers are integral to the vitality 
of the legal order, innovations that displace them may also 
undermine one conception of the rule of law.  




“When I first started my work back in 1988,” a Chinese 
judge recalled, “the court was located in a shared office 
building.”1 
 
Many cases were heard in judges’ offices. It was 
common to see judges trying cases while their 
colleagues were working [in the same space]. 
There were no heaters, air-conditioners or 
computers. Law clerks took notes of the trial 
minutes by hands, with a sweating back in the 
summer and freezing hands and feet in the 
winter . . . . Judges rode bikes to handle cases 
outside the office, and to deliver and serve court 
documents. There were no printers. Issuance of 
legal documents relied on the only old 
typewriter which the court had.2  
 
Case judgments were not easily accessible to the masses. Indeed 
they “were of the ‘for-your-eyes-only’ sort, never intended for 
readers even outside of the authoring institution.”3 As such, they 
were not widely disseminated and were usually inscrutable.4 
The difference three decades later could not be starker.5 
Suits may be filed online, and parties receive updates through 
 
1 Zhou Qi (周琪), Guangyin Yanzhong Fayuan de Bianqian (光阴眼中法院
的变迁) [The Changes of Courts in the Eyes of Time], RENMIN FAYUANBAO 
( 人民法院报 ) [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY] (Sep. 1, 2018, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/09/id/3482084.shtml. 
2 Id. 
3  Neil J. Diamant, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in China: Beyond 
Mediation-Centered Approaches, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 523, 527 (2000). 
4 Id. 
5 See Tian Jing (田婧) & Xie Weihui (谢伟辉), Gaige Kaifang 40 Zhounian 
Tukan Zhejia Fayuan de Suiyue Bianqian (改革开放 40 周年 图看这家法院
的岁月变迁) [40 Year Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up: Looking at 
the Changes of This Court by Time from Pictures], SOHU.COM JINGFA 
WANGSHI ( 搜 狐  京 法 网 事 ) (Oct. 19, 2018, 4:59 PM), 
http://www.sohu.com/a/270125722_100024666; see also Xuqianshi Zhongji 
Renmin Fayuan (宿迁市中级人民法院 ) [Suqian Intermediate People’s 
Court], Gaige Kaifang 40 Zhounian Shuyang Fayuan: Zhaopian Jianzheng 
Shidai Bianqian (改革开放 40 周年 沭阳法院：照片见证时代变迁) [40 
Year Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up: Shuyang Court: Witness the 
Change by Time Through Pictures], NETEASE (网易) (Dec. 19, 2018, 6:35 
PM), http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/E3DKTK660514BTM5.html. 
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digital platforms that also allow them to inquire about the status 
of their litigation. When the matter goes to trial, evidence is 
automatically presented on the oral request of the judge or the 
participants. 6  The same artificial intelligence system is also 
capable of sieving out unreliable evidence and detecting 
contradictions between statements. 7  As the dispute nears a 
resolution, computers generate draft opinions that relate its 
background and procedural history. Algorithms for identifying 
similar fact patterns raise the alarm if a judge’s decision veers 
too far from the norm. And the opinions and outcomes of cases 
are published on the internet for all to see. 
 





Of course, China is not alone in technologizing law. 
Some American state courts take machine predictions of 
recidivism into account when sentencing criminal defendants.8 
The Singapore judiciary has embraced an Intelligent Courts 
Transcription System for generating written records of oral 
proceedings in real time.9 The Brazilian Superior Tribunal of 
Justice, for its part, launched Sócrates, an initiative to automate 
the search for relevant legal materials. 10  And the Estonian 
 
6 Jiang Wei, China Uses AI Assistive Tech on Court Trial for First Time, 
CHINA DAILY (Jan. 24, 2019, 2:23 PM), 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/24/WS5c4959f9a3106c65c34e64e
a.html.  
7  Wang Qi, Shanghai Uses Artificial Intelligence System to Streamline 
Justice, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019, 9:05 PM), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1162852.shtml. 
8 See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
9 See See Kee Oon, State Courts Workplan 2019, “State Courts: 2020 and 
Beyond,” SINGAPORE STATE COURTS (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/cws/Resources/Documents/State_Courts_W
orkplan2019_KeynoteAddress(FINAL).pdf. 
10 Projeto-piloto do Sócrates, programa de inteligência artificial do STJ, é 
esperado para Agosto [Pilot Project of Sócrates, STJ's Artificial Intelligence 
Program, is Expected for August], MIGALHAS (Apr. 6, 2019, 7:32 PM), 
A Beijing Court in the 1990s 
Source:  
Suqian Intermediate People’s 
Court 2018 
 
A Shanghai Court in 2019 
Source: Legal Daily, 2019 
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ministry of justice is entertaining the idea of having a robot judge 
handle small claims.11 Still, few nations have been as fervent or 
forceful in digitizing and automating its legal system as the 
People’s Republic has. 12  Out of the 933 lawtech patents 
registered in 2018, more than half were filed in China.13 “When 
it comes to making court decisions available online,” write 
Benjamin Liebman and coauthors, “China is a trendsetter in the 
authoritarian world, and unusual even among other civil law 
jurisdictions,” and its courts might well “leapfrog” those of other 
countries into the future of “computerized judging.”14 
Part of the explanation for this phenomenon might lie in 
China’s quest to cement its status as a superpower. As Professor 
Timothy Wu has observed, “Beijing has made winning the race 
to artificial intelligence a national obsession, devoting billions of 
the dollars to the cause . . . .”15 Achieving such a technological 
edge, the Chinese government believes, will allow the country 
to emerge from its century of humiliation and reshape the world 
order.16 The technologization of the legal system is a microcosm 
of China’s ambitions to establish itself in the first rank of 
nations. Rachel Stern and co-authors allude to this perspective 
when they observe that 
China’s push for [artificial intelligence] is an 
important part of the country’s strategic response 
to slowing economic growth, on the one hand, 
and motivated by a pervasive belief in nationalist 




11 Can AI Be a Fair Judge in Court: Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. 25, 
2019, 7:00AM), https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-judge-court-
estonia-thinks-so/. 
12  See Jinting Deng, Should the Common Law System Welcome Artificial 
Intelligence: A Case Study of China’s Same-Type Case Reference System, 3 
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 223, 228 (2019) (“Unlike the [United States], China has 
no strong resistance to equipping its courtrooms with algorithmic machines 
and has, in fact, welcomed them.”). 
13 Macro Prudential, China Leads the Way in Legal Technology Patents, New 
Figures Show, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 16, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/13ec27bc-304c-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8. 
14 Benjamin Liebman et al., Mass Digitization of Chinese Court Decisions: 
How to Use Text as Data in the Field of Chinese Law, 8 J. L. & CTS. 177, 180-
83 (2020).  
15 Tim Wu, America’s Risky Approach to Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/opinion/ai-research-
funding.html. 
16 Nathan Gardels, Comment: The US-China Tech Battle is Make-Or-Break, 
36 NEW PERSP. Q. 2, 3 (2019). 
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the other. Viewed through this lens, the courts’ 
strides toward algorithmic analytics contribute 
to the ‘first in the world’ narrative of 
technological success poised to become a 
prominent part of the Party’s twenty-first century 
legitimacy strategy.17 
But the great enthusiasm for integrating technology into 
the legal sphere could also be explained by the inconsistencies 
and oppositions that pervade justice in the People’s Republic. 
First, courts are straining under the burden of their caseloads as 
the turn towards legality swells the number of lawsuits while the 
professionalization of the judicial corps also culls its ranks. 
Artificial intelligence enhances the speed and consistency of 
adjudication while online disclosure cultivates public trust in the 
courts. Second, adherence to legal rules and norms brings order 
to society but it may also foment dissatisfaction and disrupt 
relationships. The ensuing governmental imperative for judges 
to mediate disputes has, however, resulted in coerced settlements 
and delayed verdicts. Machine predictions of case outcomes, 
supplied by courts, guide parties to bargain in the shadow of the 
law, thereby preserving the voluntariness of peace and the 
sanctity of justice. Third, while the party-state encourages 
citizens to know the law and use it as their weapon, civil society 
and activist lawyers may rally behind a legal cause to challenge 
the ideological hegemony of the party-state. By helping citizens 
learn the law and claim their rights, databases and applications 
foster legal consciousness while disintermediating lawyers. To 
be clear, we are not arguing that the People’s Republic has 
intentionally engineered technology to perfect its brand of 
socialist legality. The modest suggestion, rather, is that 
initiatives for administering justice simply, swiftly, and singly 
have blossomed because they correspond to the demands of the 
Chinese legal order, a system that privileges above all the 
maintenance of social harmony and stability. 
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I surveys how 
technology is being applied to democratize law, expedite legal 
processes, and superintend judicial decisions. The exposition 
does not feign exhaustiveness. Rather it systemically details the 
major functions performed—or at least advertised—by 
databases, applications, and software that are now proliferating 
 
17 Rachel Stern, Ben L. Liebman, Margaret E. Roberts & Alice Z. Wang, The 
Challenges of Data-Drive Governance in Contemporary China (forthcoming 
in COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.). 
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across the country. Part II then elucidates three tensions in the 
Chinese legal system, namely the opposition between legality 
and judicial professionalization, between social harmony and the 
rule of law, and between legal consciousness and party 
hegemony. In so doing, it suggests how evolving technological 
capabilities answer some of the dilemmas that characterize 
justice in the People’s Republic today. Finally, Part III presents 
some results from a survey of approximately one thousand 
netizens and interviews of over one hundred legal aid seekers. 
These field studies illuminate popular attitudes, beliefs, and 
perceptions about legal technology and its practical 
consequences, thereby furnishing an empirical basis for 
theorizing about the future of Chinese justice. The normative 
implications of our research findings are also broached and 
discussed. 
 
I. THE TECHNOLOGIZATION OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM  
 
In January 2016, Zhou Qiang, the president of the 
Chinese Supreme People’s Court (SPC) introduced the concept 
of smart courts (zhihui fayuan).18 Smart courts “make full use of 
technologies such as the internet, cloud computing, big data, 
artificial intelligence and so on, to promote the modernization of 
trial system and judgment capability . . . .”19 They are, as the SPC 
later elaborated, “a form of organization, construction, and 
operation whereby the people’s courts take full advantage of 
advanced information systems to support the online processing 
of all services, the disclosure of the entire legal process as 
mandated by law, and comprehensive all-around intelligent 
services, so as to realize fair justice and justice for the people.”20 
 
18 Luo Shuqin (罗书臻), Jianchi Xuqiu he Wenti Daoxiang Pojie Nanti Buqi 
Duanban Tuijin Renmin Fayuan Xinxihua Jianshe Zhuanxing Shengji (坚持
需求和问题导向 破解难题补齐短板 推进人民法院信息化建设转型升级
) [Insist upon Directing Demand and Problems. Tackle Conundrums and Fix 
Shortcomings. Promote the People’s Courts’ Upgrade and Transition into 
Digitalization], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) 
[CHINACOURT.ORG] (Jan. 30, 2016, 9:11 AM), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/01/id/1801764.shtml. 
19 Yu Ziru (于子茹), Chen Zhiyuan: Zhihui Fayuan Rang Xinxi Duo Paolu 
Rang Qunzhong Shao Paotui (陈志远：智慧法院让信息多跑路 让群众少
跑腿 ) [Chen Zhiyuan: Smart Courts Allows Information to Cover More 
Ground and the People to Run Less], XINHUA NET (新华网) (Mar. 12, 2017, 
12:27 PM), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/03/id/2577050.shtml. 
20 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jiakuai Jianshe Zhihui Fayuan De Yijian 
(最高人民法院关于加快建设智慧法院的意见) [The Opinions of the 
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The SPC’s efforts in this regard were endorsed by no less than 
President Xi Jinping who, in July 2017, urged “adherence to the 
laws” and called for “integration between deepening judicial 
reform and the application of modern technology so as to 
continuously perfect and develop a socialist legal system with 
Chinese characteristics.” 21  Though promoted at the highest 
echelons of power, the technologization of the justice system 
does not always follow a detailed national blueprint. Rather, the 
ways and means of deploying technology in law—as in other 
domains—22are usually left to the initiative of local authorities 
and the ingenuity of private actors. The role of the central 
government is often exhortatory and facilitative.  
Pursuant to the call for the development of smart courts, 
internet platforms and artificial intelligence systems have 
proliferated in the legal sphere. Whether they are offered by 
courts or companies, these innovations strive to simplify the 
litigation process for citizens and lawyers, help judges render 
their decisions more quickly and fairly, and disseminate legal 
information and advice to the general public. Some of them have 
achieved official recognition and are being emulated across the 
nation. Others remain experiments run on a modest scale. But 
together, they begin to transform how law and legal institutions 
operate in China.  
  
A.   Advising Disputants, Simplifying Litigation 
 
The financial, logistical, and technical difficulties of 
filing a case have always deterred many from turning to the 
courts. For a long time, disputants were facing overlong waiting 
times and complicated and miscellaneous procedures to file a 
 
Supreme People’s Court concerning Accelerating the Establishment of 
Smart Courts] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Apr. 12, 2017, 
effective Apr. 12, 2017) SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., NOV. 10, 2017, Art. 1 (1), 
at 19 (China), available at 
http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/5dec527431cdc22b72163b49fc0284.ht
ml. 
21 Nie Chenjing (聂晨静) & Zhang Mingyu (张明宇), Xi Jinping: Jianding 
Buyi Tuijian Sifa Tizhi Gaige Jianding Buyi Zou Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi 
Fazhi Daolu (习近平：坚定不移推进司法体制改革 坚定不移走中国特色
社会主义法治道路) [Xi Jinping: Firmly Advance the Reform of the Judicial 
System， Firmly Take the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], 
XINHUA NET ( 新 华 网 ) (July 10, 2017, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2017-07/10/c_1121295680.htm?agt=2/. 
22 Matt Sheehan, How China’s Massive AI Plan Actually Works, MACRO 
POLO (Feb. 12, 2018), https://macropolo.org/analysis/how-chinas-massive-
ai-plan-actually-works/.  
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complaint in court. 23  The parties and attorneys had to make 
multiple trips to the court to follow up or submit supplementary 
materials before a complaint was finally accepted.24 To attain a 
high case closing rate, some courts even put a daily cap on the 
number of complaints that can be submitted in its case filing hall 
or left complaints in limbo during busy seasons. 25  Legal 
technology are starting to erode these barriers. 
At the bottom of the dispute pyramid, artificial 
intelligence helps litigants recognize harms and articulate 
claims.26 Although several robots have been tested,27 the most 
widely adopted one appears to be Xiao Fa. Installed in over a 
hundred courts, Xiao Fa dispenses knowledge about substantive 
and procedural law.28 To educate the public, Xiao Fa explains 
complicated legal terms in everyday terms.29 To calm disputants, 
 
23 Beijing Kainuo Lushi Shiwusuo (北京凯诺律师事务所) [Beijing Kainuo 
Law Firm], Naxie Yuanyin hui Daozhi Lian Nan Ne? Ruhe Pojie “Lian Nan” 
de Wenti (哪些原因会导致立案难呢？如何破解“立案难”的问题) [What 
are the Factors Causing the “Difficulties of Filing a Case”? How to Tackle 
the “Difficulties of Filing a Case”], XINLANG (新浪) [SINA.COM] (May 8, 




25 Xu Xin (徐昕), Jiejue Lian Nan Yao Lizu Zhongguo Guoqing (解决“立案
难”要立足中国国情) [Tackling the “Difficulties of Filing a Case” Needs to 
be Based on China’s Situation], 1 ZHONGGUO SHENPAN (中国审判) [CHINA 
ADJUDICATION] 10, 11 (2007); see also, Zhang Chen (张晨 ), 2020nian 
Quanguo Shixian Wangshang Lian he Kuayu Lian (2020 年全国实现网上立
案和跨域立案) [Online Case Filing and Cross-regional Case Filing will be 
Achieved Nationwide in 2020], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) LEGAL DAILY (June 
14, 2019, 7:48 AM) ，  http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2019-
06/14/c_1124620759.htm.  
26Cao Yin, Courts Embrace AI to Improve Efficiency, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 16, 
2017, 7:55 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-
11/16/content_34595221.htm. 
27 Xiao Yu, developed by the Yushan Primary People's Court in Ma’anshan, 
Anhui Province, is one example. Zhang Ying (张颖), Jinri Shuofa Sa 
Beining Duihua Quanguo Shouge Daosu Jiqiren Xiaoyu he Tade Baba (今
日说法|撒贝宁对话全国首个导诉机器人“小雨”和她的“爸爸”) [Today's 
Statement | Sa Beining Talks to the First Pilot Robot "Xiao Yu" and Her 
"Dad"], SINLANG (新浪) [SINA.COM] (Mar. 12, 2017, 5:44 PM), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-03-12/doc-ifychavf2500227.shtml (Xiao 
Yu, developed by the Yushan Primary People's Court in Ma’anshan, Anhui 
Province, is one example). 
28 The robots themselves are manufactured and sold by Sanbot, SANBOT, 
http://en.sanbot.com/industrial/public-service (last visited Nov. 10, 2020). 
Cao Yin, supra note 26. 
29 Cao Yin, supra note 26. 
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Xiao Fa speaks in a child’s voice. 30  As explained by Du 
Xiangyang, the founder of Aegis Data, the robot addresses a 
societal need for cheap and authoritative advice. 31  “Most 
answers provided by search engines are based on other people’s 
experiences, and are not professional opinions, while consulting 
a lawyer costs a lot of money.”32 By installing a robot, courts are 
able to freely dispense legal knowledge tailored to the locality’s 
circumstances. Consulting Xiao Fa, however, requires a visit to 
the courthouse. To save members of the public the time and 
expense of travel, Aegis also maintains an online platform 
offering legal information and services.33 Hosted on WeChat—
one of China’s most used mobile phone applications—Aegis’s 
cloud computing platform reportedly “receives more than 
30,000 requests every day,” “provid[ing] immediate answers for 
85 percent of the questions.”34 
Grievants who are considering legal action might also 
find automated litigation tools handy. Lining the self-service 
area of many Beijing courts, for instance, are one-stop terminals 
that estimate litigation costs and draft complaints.35 Based on 
self-administered questionnaires, these terminals produce 
reports estimating the risk of an unsuccessful suit and describing 
potential litigation costs, such as harm to family relationships, 
 





35  Fei Qiulin ( 费秋林 ), Xicheng Fayuan Xinsusong Fuwu Zhongxin 
Luocheng, Dongdong Shouzhi Jiuke Wancheng Susong Fuwu (西城法院新
诉讼服务中心落成，动动手指就可完成诉讼服务 ) [New Litigation 
Service Centre is Established in Xicheng Court, Litigation Services Can be 
Completed by Moving Fingers], SOHU BEIJING XICHENG (搜狐北京西城) 
[SOHU.COM BEIJING CITY WEST] (Nov. 30, 2018, 5:45 PM), 
https://www.sohu.com/a/278924837_120025792; see also Wei Wenxin (魏
文欣), Susong Fengxian Pingguji zai Beijing Fangshan Shanggang (诉讼风
险评估机在北京房山上岗) [Litigation Risk Assessment Machines Started 
Their Work in the Fangshan District of Beijing], BEIJING RIBAO (北京日报) 
[BEIJING DAILY], Aug. 14, 2019, 
http://www.cnr.cn/bj/jrbj/20190814/t20190814_524730629.shtml; see also 
Tanfang Beijing Chaoyang Fayuan: Weixin Kuaisu Lian Susong Fengxian 
Zizhu Pinggu (探访北京朝阳法院：微信快速立案 诉讼风险自助评估) 
[Visit the Chaoyang People’s Court of Beijing: Quick Complaint Filing on 
WeChat, Self Evaluate Risk of Litigation], ZHONGGUO RIBAO WANG (中国
日 报 网 ) [CHINA DAILY] (Feb. 27, 2018, 9:02 AM), 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1593513970807412165&wfr=spider&for=
pc. 
2020] COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW 11 
time, money, and reputation. 36  The reports also enumerate 
applicable statutes, identify related cases, and list the documents 
required at each stage of the proceedings.37 If a party is inclined 
to mediate, a judge or a mediator will host a conference in which 
both sides can present evidence, negotiate, and enter into a 
settlement agreement. 38  If a party elects adjudication, a 
complaint generator helps formulate the claim, free of charge.39 
These and analogous tools are being rolled out in courts around 
the country. 40 Interviewed by the local paper in the hall of the 
Wancheng District People’s Court in Nanyang City of Henan 
Province, a litigant praised its litigation guidance machine as 
being “so useful.” “I know little about law,” said Mr. Li, holding 
a copy of his litigation risk assessment report. “The report 
explains everything clearly and even has the judgments of 
similar cases. Now I understand how to litigate without spending 
money to consult a lawyer.”41   
 
36See Susong Fengxian Pinggu Xitong (诉讼风险评估系统) [Litigation 
Risk Assessment System], SHOWINFO, 
http://showinfo.com.cn/products/ligitationRisk.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
2020) (For example, a party who is filing for divorce may need to answer 
questions, such as whether it is their first time suing for divorce, whether 
their spouse has engaged in domestic violence, gambling or drug use, and 
whether the dispute involves any assets division). 
37 Wei Wenxin, supra note 35. 
38 Jiang Shanshan (姜珊珊), Beijing Gaoyuan: 17 Wanqi Anjian Tongguo 
Duoyuan Tiaojie Sucai (北京高院：17 万起案件通过多元调解速裁) [High 
People’s Court of Beijing: 170 Thousand Cases were Decided by Various 
Mediation Approaches in an Expedited Proceeding], SINLANG SIFA PENGBAI 
XINWEN (新浪司法 澎湃新闻) [SINA CIVIL LAW THE PAPER] (Nov. 7, 2018, 
2:43 PM), news.sina.com.cn/sf/news/fzrd/2018-11-07/doc-
ihmutuea7850626.shtml.  
39 Tanfang Beijing Chaoyang Fayuan: Weixin Kuaisu Lian Susong Fengxian 
Zizhu Pinggu (探访北京朝阳法院：微信快速立案 诉讼风险自助评估) 
[Visit the Chaoyang People’s Court of Beijing: Quick Complaint Filing on 
WeChat, Self Evaluate Risk of Litigation], supra note 35. 
40 Zhao Jingqing (赵敬清), Susong Fengxian Pinggu Nalizhao Dashuju Zhuli 
Fenxi Zaozhidao (诉讼风险评估哪里找 大数据助力分析早知道) [Where 
to Find Litigation Risk Assessment? Big Data Helps to Analyze and Know 
Early], THE PAPER ( 澎 湃 新 闻 ) (May 23, 2020, 6:01 AM), 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_7522531; see also Ji 
Zhangying (季张颖), Xuhuiqu Renmin Fayuan Shangxianle Quanshi Shouge 
Susong Fengxian Pinggu Xitong (徐汇区人民法院上线了全市首个诉讼风
险评估系统) [Xuhui District People’s Court Adopted the First Litigation 
Risk Assessment System in the Municipality], DONGFANG WANG (东方网) 
[EASTDAY] (May 22, 2019, 9:53 AM), 
http://city.021east.com/eastday/city/gk/20190522/u1a14850527_K30062.ht
ml. 
41 Wang Yong (王勇), Da Guansi Fengxian Dabuda Dehua Duoshaoqian 
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When the complaint is ready, it may be filed in person or 
through WeChat. Cases will be electronically routed to the court 
having jurisdiction over the matter, even if that court is based in 
a different part of the country. 42  This system was piloted in 
Zhejiang Province and fully implemented in all basic and 
intermediate people’s courts as of December 2019.43 A total of 
19,471 cases were handled through the cross-regional filing 
mechanism from the full implementation of the program in July 
2019 and December 2019.44 
Filing of the complaint is merely the beginning of the 
legal process and as the case progresses, there will be fees to be 
paid, documents to be exchanged, deadlines to be observed, and 
pauses in between. Since December 30, 2015, the SPC has 
maintained an online portal for lawyers to access casefiles, 
inquire about statuses, reschedule appointments in the event of a 
time conflict, contact judges, and serve legal documents.45 The 
apex court is also piloting a unified nationwide platform for 
 
Xuyao Duochang Shijian Susong Fengxian Pingguji Shadouzhidao (打官司
风险大不大？得花多少钱？需要多长时间？“诉讼风险评估机”啥都知
道) [How Big Would the Risk of Litigation Be? How Much Would It Cost? 
How Much Time Would It Require? The Litigation Risk Assessment 
Machine Knows Everything], NANYANG DAILY (南阳日报) (Dec. 22, 2019, 
5:39 PM), http://www.longtengnanyang.com/news_75479.  
42  THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN DE HULIANWANG SIFA (中国法院的互联网司法 ) 
[CHINESE COURTS AND INTERNET JUDICIARY] 69 (2019).  
43 Press Release, Li Guangyu (李广宇), News Spokesman, The Supreme 
People’s Court of The People’s Republic of China, (Dec. 25, 2019), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-212371.html. 
44 Id. 
45 Li, supra note 43. 
Litigation Risk Assessment and 
Complaint Generator Terminals in 
Chaoyang Court of Beijing 
Source: Chinanews, 2018 
 
Xiao Fa in the High People’s Court of 
Anhui Province 
Source: High People’s Court of Anhui 
Province NetEase Account, 2018 
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parties and lawyers to receive case-related documents through 
email, phone messages, and instant messaging applications.46 
The lower courts have also developed similar channels for 
facilitating service on litigants or their representatives.47 By the 
end of 2018, 2,995 courts across the country provided litigation 
services through their official websites while 1,623 courts had 
launched their own mobile applications.48 
More ambitious still is the concept of Mobile Courts that 
is now being tested in 12 provinces, including Beijing. 49 
Brandishing the slogan “let data cover more ground, let litigants 
run less,” Mobile Courts replicate physical tribunals in 
cyberspace by moving proceedings out of courthouses into 
mobile phones. Built into Mobile Courts are many of the services 
found on the internet platforms of individual courts, such as 
question answering, case evaluation, and electronic filing and 
service. But Mobile Courts go further. By combining remote 
audio and video capture on the one hand and facial recognition 
and e-signature technologies on the other, Mobile Courts enable 
parties to engage in discovery, mediation or trial through 
WeChat. As of October 31, 2019, the mini-program had 1.16 
million registered litigants and 73,200 registered lawyers, who 
among them completed 3.14 million litigation activities through 
Mobile Courts.50 The experience of Zhejiang Province, the SPC 
claims, is illustrative of the convenience of “complaining with 
your fingertips and dealt with in your palm.”51 
 
46Minshi Susong Chengxu Fanjian Fenliu Gaige Shidian Shishi Banfa (民事
诉讼程序繁简分流改革试点实施办法) [Implementation Measures for the 
Pilot Reform of Triaging Simplified and Complicated Civil Procedures], 
RENMIN FAYUANBAO (人民法院报 ) [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY] (Jan. 16, 
2020), http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2020-
01/16/content_164459.htm?div=-1; THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 42 at 76. 
47 See THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
supra note 42 at 68. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 70. See Alison Xu, Chinese Judicial Justice on the Cloud: A Future 
Call or a Pandora’s Box? An Analysis of the ‘Intelligent Court System’ of 
China, 26 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 59, 62 (2017) (distinguishing between the 
“readable,” “writable,” and “executable” stages of Chinese judicial reform). 
50 Id. at 70. 
51  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (最高人民法院工作报告 ) 
[Work Report of The Supreme People's Court], XINHUA WANG (新华网) 
[XINHUA NET], Mar. 19, 2019, available at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-03/19/c_1124253887.htm; Zheng 
Xiaowei ( 郑 晓 维 ), Zhejiang Jiaojiang Yidong Fating Zhijiansu 
Zhangshangban Tiaojie Zuikuai 20 Fenzhong (浙江椒江“移动”法庭：指尖
诉掌上办  调解最快 20 分钟 ) [Zhejiang Jiaojiang “Mobile” Court: 
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B.   Facilitating Administration, Guiding Adjudication 
 
Besides making the legal process more accessible and 
less costly for disputants, technology also helps judges dispose 
of cases quickly and accurately. On the one hand, artificial 
intelligence substitutes for human labor by performing mundane 
tasks that require neither knowledge nor craft. On the other hand, 
it complements human reason by spotting outliers or patterns 
that might otherwise be lost in a mass of data.   
Machines relieve the burden on court personnel by 
transcribing hearings, verifying the authenticity of documents, 
sieving through evidence, and drafting orders and judgments.52 
 
Complaining with Your Fingertips and Dealt with in Your Palm, Fastest 
Mediation is 20 Minutes], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG (中国新闻网) [CHINA 
NEWS] (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:46 PM), http://www.zj.chinanews.com/jzkzj/2020-
02-13/detail-ifztrass1773226.shtml; Huang Lanshu ( 黄 兰 舒 ), Yidong 
Weifayuan Rang Shuju Duopaolu Rang Qunzhong Shao Paotui (移动微法院
让数据多跑路，让群众少跑腿) [The Mobile Micro-court Allows Data to 
Run More and the People to Run Less], THE PAPER (澎湃新闻) (Nov. 1, 2019, 
7:48 PM), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_4858610. 
52 See, e.g., Suzhoushi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (苏州市中
级人民法院工作报告 ) [Work Report of Suzhou Intermediate People's 
Court], SUZHOU INTERMEDIATE PEOPLE'S COURT (苏州市中级人民法院), 
Sep. 5, 2019, available at 
http://www.zjrmfy.suzhou.gov.cn/fypage/toContentPage/swgk/82a07a4869
231983016cff516abc03e8; Jiangsusheng Kunshanshi Renmin Fayuan Dazao 
SPC Online Portal for 
Litigation Services 
Mobile Courts Platform for 
Zhejiang Province 
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In May 2018, the SPC introduced a smart court application suite 
engineered by Hua Yu that “was able to effectively reduce at 
least 75 percent of time judges spent on pre-trial document 
review” and “automatically generate over 70 percent of 
adjudicatory documents.”53  
Local courts have also heeded the call to automate their 
adjudicatory processes. New to the Zhejiang High People’s 
Court is a virtual judicial assistant who specializes in financial 
loan disputes—Xiao Zhi. Xiao Zhi’s duties extend beyond 
administrative tasks like scheduling. Xiao Zhi supports judges 
by analyzing case filings, summarizing points of contention as 
they are raised during trial, evaluating evidence, calculating 
awards, and drafting judicial documents on the fly.54 A timeline 
of events is also constructed for the court’s easy reference and 
Xiao Zhi helps locate points in the trial video based on text 
queries. Aided by Xiao Zhi, a case could be heard and decided 
in less than 30 minutes from start to finish.  
Not too far away, in Shanghai, the 206 System locates 
and displays the evidence to which participants referred while 
generating real time transcripts of their statements.55 When the 
Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court publicly unveiled 
these functionalities at a robbery and murder trial in January 
 
Wuzhihua Shenpan Guanli Qiandeng Fangan Shifang Zhihui Shenpan 
Xindongneng (江苏省昆山市人民法院——打造无纸化审判管理“千灯方
案” 释放智慧审判新动能) [Kunshan People's Court, Jiangsu Province—
Create the "Thousand Lamps Plan" for Paperless Trial Management and 
Unleash a New Drive for Smart Trials], RENMIN FAYUANBAO (人民法院报) 
[PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY] (July 26, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-173402.html. 
53  Han Xuguang ( 韩绪光 ), Xinyidai Zhihui Fayuan Yingyong Xitong 
Shangxian 70% Yishang Tingshen Wenben Ke Zidong Shengcheng (新一代
智慧法院应用系统上线  70%以上庭审文本可自动生成 ) [The New 
Generation of Smart Courts Application System is Live, Over 70 Percent of 
Adjudicatory Documents Can be Automatically Generated], ZHONGGUO 
FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [CHINACOURT.ORG] (May 24, 2018, 4:17 
PM), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/05/id/3316626.shtml. 
54  Ma Muqing (马牧青), Zhejiang AI Faguan Zhu Minjian Jiedai Jiufen 
Shixian Quanliucheng Zhishen (浙江“AI 法官”助民间借贷纠纷实现全流
程智审) [Zhejiang “AI judge” Implementing Smart Trials in Civil Lending 
Disputes], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG (中国新闻网) [CHINA NEWS] (Dec, 
30, 2019, 9:52 AM), http://www.zj.chinanews.com/jzkzj/2019-12-30/detail-
ifzscnqu9301636.shtml. 
55  Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Guanyu Falu Rengong Zhineng Zai Zhongguo 
Yunyong Qianjing de Ruogan Sikao (关于法律人工智能在中国运用前景的
若 干 思 考 ) [Some Thoughts on the Application of Legal Artificial 
Intelligence in China], 12 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 108, 113 (2018). 
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2019, deputy chief judge Huang Boqing praised the software for 
“helping them get better results in lesser time.” 56 According to 
developer iFlyTek, as of November 2020, its speech recognition 
algorithm is now used by over 10,000 courts in 31 provinces.57 
iFlyTek is not the only company delivering technology solutions 
to the judiciary. Ledict, for example, has built an automated 
transcription system that is not only synchronous but also self-
correcting. 58  The ability of this system to recognize case 
information is touted at over 95%; the completeness of the 
transcripts might reach 100%.59 Adopted by the Liaoning High 
Court, automated transcription speeds up the wheels of justice, 
especially in controversial and complex cases.60 
 





Artificial intelligence does not merely conserve judicial 
time and resources. It may also improve the consistency and 
quality of adjudication with its accurate recommendation of 
related laws and similar cases and automatic generation and 
 
56 Wu Lei, AI-aided Justice: How Technology Is Changing Chinese Courts, 
CGTN (Feb. 23, 2019, 2:29 PM), 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414f7a67444f32457a6333566d54/index.ht
ml. 
57 Zhihui Fayuan (智慧法院) [Smart Courts], KEDA XUNFEI (科大讯飞) 
[IFLYTEK], 
http://www.iflytek.com/zf/fy?fbclid=IwAR1JZMeTe_c4Nsh3_aub3gYWuz
n0jQvt3lPqle29A3y6r_pQpD9yeYAG4QI (last visited November 10, 2020). 
58  Liaoning Zhihui Fayuan (辽宁智慧法院 ) [Liaoning Smart Courts], 
Quansheng 128jia Fayuan Shixian Zhineng Yuyin Yingyong Quanfugai, 
Chuangzhao Liaoning Zhihui Fayuan Xingaodu (全省 128家法院实现智能
语音应用全覆盖，创造辽宁“智慧法院”新高度) [All 128 Courts in the 
Province Have Achieved Full Coverage of AI Voice Applications, Bringing 




“Xiao Zhi” assisting adjudication in 
a Hangzhou court 
Source: Hangzhou Wang, 2019 
  
A prosecutor referring to evidence 
using the Shanghai’s 206 system 
Source: Eastday, 2019 
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correction of judicial documents.61 As a collaboration between 
the SPC and Gridsum Technology, Faxin forages a public 
database of regulations, judicial documents, cases, and academic 
research to define the legal contours of a dispute. 62  Faxin is 
deployed in the SPC as well as the Jiangsu63 and Shanghai64 
High Courts. Since 2018, the SPC has also made the “Similar 
Case Intelligent Recommendation System” available to judges, 
lawyers, and members of the public through the China Justice 
Big Data Service Platform.65 As its name suggests, the system 
recommends similar cases based on the facts, the nature of the 
dispute, and the statutes implicated.66 Many local courts, due to 
the underdevelopment of their own case research system, have 
been using the systems developed by external commercial 
companies.67 The Beijing courts employ Smart Judge, a machine 
 
61  THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
supra note 42, at 80. 
62  Yang Qing (杨青 ), Zuigaofa Gongzuo Baogao Reci Zhihui Fayuan 
Daohang Xitong Faxin (最高法工作报告热词: 智慧法院导航系统 法信) 
[Supreme Court Work Report Hot Words: Wisdom Court Navigation System 
Law Letter], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [CHINACOURT.ORG] 
(Mar. 10, 2018, 9:46 AM), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/03/id/3225406.shtml; see 
also THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
supra note 42, at 80; see also Lin Zizhen, Wang Yiyin, & Teng Jingxuan, 
Could AI Transform China’s Legal System?, CAIXIN, Dec. 11, 2017, 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-12-11/could-ai-transform-chinas-legal-
system-101183154.html. 
63  Faxin zai Jiangsusheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan zuo Quansheng Fayuan 
Peixun (“法信”在江苏省高级人民法院做全省法院培训) [Faxin Trained 
Courts across the Province in the High People’s Court of Jiangsu], RENMIN 
FAYUAN CHUBAN JITUAN (人民法院出版集团 ) [COURT BOOK] (July 8, 
2016, 6:07 PM), http://www.courtbook.com.cn/fxdt/29649.jhtml. 
64 Faxin zai Shanghaishi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Yanshi Xuanjiang (“法信”在
上海市高级人民法院演示宣讲) [Faxin Presented and Gave a Speech at the 
High People’s Court of Shanghai], RENMIN FAYUAN CHUBAN JITUAN (人民
法 院 出 版 集 团 ) [COURT BOOK] (July 29, 2016, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.courtbook.com.cn/fxdt/29650.jhtml. 
65 Jiang Ping (姜萍), Zuigaofa Zhihui Fayuan Daohang Xitong he Leian 
Zhineng Tuisong Xitong Jintian Shangxian (最高法智慧法院导航系统和类
案智能推送系统今天上线) [The SPC Adopted the Smart Courts Navigation 
System and Similar Case Recommendation System Today], YANG GUANG 
WANG (央广网) [CHINA NATIONAL RADIO] (January 5, 2018, 7:11 PM), 
http://china.cnr.cn/gdgg/20180106/t20180106_524089319.shtml; see also 
China Justice Big Data Service Platform, 
http://data.court.gov.cn/pages/caseAnalysis.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
66 Id. 
67 Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Ruhe Tongguo Rengong Zhineng Shixian Leian 
Leipan (如何通过人工智能实现类案类判) [How to Ensure Similar Cases 
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that simulates the judicial thought process. 68  The software 
identifies the legal questions presented by a case, retrieves 
materials germane to their resolution, and recommends a 
disposition.69 Similarly, Hainan judges are being encouraged by 
their provincial high court to adopt an “intelligent system” that 
combines “natural language processing, knowledge graphs[,] 
and deep learning” to distill the essence of a case and formulate 
a judgment based on past decisions.70 Praised by the SPC as a 
model to follow, the practice is said to enhance the uniformity of 








C.   Supervising Judges, Monitoring Courts 
 
Finally, technology is also enlisted to keep an eye on 
judges and courts. Internally, some courts are using the very 
algorithms that identify and analyze similar cases to detect 
 
are Treated Similarly by Artificial Intelligence], 2 CHINA L. REV. 26 (2018). 
68 Yu Guiqing (佘贵清), Li Xiang (李响), Sun Bing (孙冰) & Wu Juan (吴
娟), Jieli Dashuju Zhihui Zu Faguan Beijing Fayuan Ruifaguan Xitong (借
力大数据 智慧助法官 – 北京法院睿法官系统) [Big Data Lends Strength 
to Smartly Assist Judges – The Smart Judge System of Beijing Courts], 
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN XINXIHUA FAZHAN BAOGAO (中国法院信息化发展报
告) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INFORMATIZATION OF CHINESE COURTS] n.2 (LI 
LIN ( 李 林 ) ET AL. EDS.) B. 21 (2018), available at 
http://www.raduga.com.cn/skwx_eypt/BookReading.aspx?ID=2630.  
69 Id. 
70 Wang Zhuhua (王祝华), Bimian Tongan Butongpan Hainan Laile Wei AI 
Faguan (避免同案不同判海南来了位 AI “法官”) [To Avoid Same Cases 
Being Decided Differently, an AI Judge Came to Hainan Province], KEJI 
RIBAO ( 科技 日报 ) [SCI. AND TECH. DAILY], Apr. 15, 2019, at 8, 
http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/html/2019-
04/15/content_419177.htm; see also Yuan Shenggao, AI-assisted Sentencing 
Speeds Up Cases in Judicial System, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 18, 2019, 7:20 AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2019-04/18/content_37459601.htm. 
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anomalies in judicial outcomes. 72  When adapted for this 
purpose, the machine draws supervisory attention to decisions 
that lie outside the bounds set by past cases. “Abnormal 
judgment warnings” are principally issued in the field of 





Externally, courts are now subject to “mass supervision”74 as 
more of judicial processes and outputs are publicly digitized. 
The SPC has established four official websites as the 
cornerstones of open justice.75 Information about case status is 
displayed on China Judicial Process Information Online, judicial 
proceedings are broadcast on China Trial Online, and 
consumption restriction orders are announced on China 
Enforcement Information Online. Since 2013, all courts, high 
and low, have been required to publish their dispositions on 
China Judgments Online. 76  Today, China Judgment Online 
 
72 Meng Yu & Guodong Du, Why Are Chinese Courts Turning to AI?, THE 
DIPLOMAT, Jan. 19, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/why-are-chinese-
courts-turning-to-ai/; see also Deng, supra note 12, at 252. 
73 Yu & Du, supra note 72. 
74  See Joel Andreas & Yige Dong, “Mass Supervision” and the 
Bureaucratization of Governance in China, TO GOVERN CHINA: EVOLVING 
PRACTICES OF POWER 123 (Vivienne Shue & Patricia M. Thornton eds., 
2017) (exposition of the concept of mass supervision). 
75  THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
supra note 42, at 71. 
76 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan zai Hulianwang Gongbu 
Caipan Wenshu de Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁
判文书的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance 
of Judgments on the Internet by the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the 
Sup. People’s Ct., Nov 21, 2013, effective Jan. 1, 2014), ZUIGAO RENMIN 
FAYUAN (最高人民法院 ) [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT.], Nov 29, 2013, (China), 
Abnormal judgment warnings system deployed by a Shanghai court 
Source: Shanghai Judicial Think Tank Sohu Account, 2018 
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contains more than 80 million judicial decisions and has been 
visited more than 37 billion times, making it the world’s largest 
repository of legal cases.  
 
II. THREE TENSIONS IN CHINESE JUSTICE 
 
The reach and sophistication of the described 
technologies may well be exaggerated.77 According to one study 
conducted in 2016, only about 50 percent of judicial documents 
had been published online and the percentages of published 
judicial documents seemed to differ among regions.78 Basing the 
similar case recommendation systems, among other smart court 
functions, on incomplete datasets will vitiate the accuracy of 
smart courts. 79  Whether due to technical or data limitations, 
jurists who have tried the case recommendation systems 
complain that the results are coarse and not sufficiently attuned 
to their needs.80 Shanghai’s 206 System also failed to impress 
 
available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-5867.html. 
77 Lin, Wang & Teng, supra note 62.  
78 To confront the “missingness” problem and the regional inconsistencies in 
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provide the case number, deciding court, decision date, and non-disclosure 
reasons when a judicial document is determined not to be published on the 
Internet. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan zai 
Hulianwang Gongbu Caipan Wenshu de Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民
法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s 
Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the Internet by the People’s Courts] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug 29, 2016, effective Oct 1, 2016) 
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Aug 31, 2016, available at http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
25321.html; see also Ma Chao (马超), Yu Xiaohong (于晓虹) & He Haibo (
何海波 ), Da Shuju Fenxi: Zhongguo Sifa Caipan Wenshu Shangwang 
Gongkai Baogao (大数据分析：中国司法裁判文书上网公开报告) [Big 
Data Analysis: Report on Online Publications of Chinese Judicial Decision 
Documents], ZHONGGUO FALU PINGLUN (中国法律评论) [CHINA L. REV.] 
195 (2016), available at 
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tml; see also Benjamin L. Liebman, Margaret Roberts, Rachel E. Stern & 
Alice Wang, Mass Digitization of Chinese Court Decision: How to Use Text 
as Data in the Field of Chinese Law, 21ST CENTURY CHINA CENTER 
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many of the judges who tested it.81 Difficulty in formulating 
criteria for ascertaining the importance of a given piece of data 
also means that “it is entirely possible for a unique element 
having a determinative impact on the [outcome of a] case to be 
filtered out by the [Shanghai 206] System during the data 
selection process.” 82  A report by the Institute of Law of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted that the various 
platforms offered by different courts do not communicate 
amongst each other and are ill-coordinated.83 Finally, “[m]any 
of the self-styled ‘artificial intelligence’ products available 
currently are essentially still supported by traditional customer 
service technology, like basic templates for forms.”84 
Despite these deficiencies and challenges, however, the 
political impetus behind legal technology remains strong. The 
digitization and automation of Chinese adjudication can be 
viewed as part of a broader trend that has seen technology seep 
into every aspect of public and private life. WeChat, one of the 
most popular applications in China, counts over a billion 
monthly active users who rely on it to send messages, pay their 
utility bills, make payments in shops and restaurants, book 
tickets for their travel, and find accommodation. In some parts 
of China, citizens are being assigned social credit scores that 
measure their civic virtue and social trustworthiness.85 Public 
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behavior, captured and analyzed by facial recognition systems, 
impact these scores. But the use of technology to ease the 
financial and administrative burdens of litigation, to make 
judicial documents transparent and accessible to laypeople, and 
to assist judges in rendering fasters and fairer decisions also 
responds to the profound tensions in the Chinese legal system.  
 
A.   Legality and Professionalization of the Judiciary 
 
First, the emphasis on legality is pressuring a judicial 
system that is still undergoing reform. Despite caricatures of 
Chinese society as lawless and Chinese law as an oxymoron, 
operating through legal forms and institutions has become ever 
more essential to governing China. China’s territory is vast and 
its population is diverse and sprawling. A system for 
regularizing and disciplining private and official behavior is 
necessary for decisions made in Beijing to be implemented 
nationally.86 This challenge—exercising political authority over 
such an expanse from the halls of power in the capital—has 
existed since imperial times, making a legal system instrumental 
to the idea of a centralized state. But while some realities have 
not changed, others have evolved. For Chinese leaders today, 
“empowering legal institutions . . . has been a major source of 
both personal status for Xi and popular political legitimacy for 
the Party.” 87  Adherence to legal rules and norms appears to 
satisfy a nascent public demand for legality. This “turn towards 
law”88 has contributed to an explosion in the number of cases 
filed in the courts. Recent statutory reforms encourage legal 
rather than political resolution of disputes. Claims that might 
have previously been abandoned or pressed through other 
avenues are now being funneled into the courts. At the same 
time, the party-state strives to “make the public feel the fairness 
and justice in each and every case”89 by raising the standard of 
adjudication and thereby enhancing popular trust in courts. The 
pool of judges has shrunk as qualification and selection have 
become more stringent. At the abstract level, the embrace of 
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legality, on the one hand, and the professionalization of the 
judiciary, on the other, are not contradictory goals. But in the 
Chinese context, they combine to lay great strain on a legal 
system that is struggling with burgeoning caseloads amidst a 
reduction in the size of the judicial corps.  
Remarkably, legally qualified judges are still a relatively 
new development in China. During the first three decades of the 
People’s Republic, law and courts were characterized as the 
“knife handle” of the state, to be wielded against class enemies.90 
Judges wore uniforms, “fulfill[ing] the same functions as the 
police and the armies.”91 Indeed, many judges were recruited 
from the People’s Liberation Army and despite having no 
background or training in law, military veterans and officials 
transferred from other governmental bodies comprised the 
majority of Chinese judges until the late 1990s.92 Of the more 
than 250,000 judges serving in 1998, only 5.6% had an 
undergraduate degree. 93  Chinese legal scholars deplored this 
state of affairs. Ma Junju and Nie Dezong from Tsinghua 
University and Wuhan University law schools bemoaned the 
lack of any standards.94 “In China, drivers can become judges, 
military cadres could become judges, workers can become 
judges; a person who never worked in political-legal organs, 
handled any cases, or studied law can be appointed as the 
president of a court.”95 He Weifang from Peking University Law 
School held that judges, being responsible for the lives of people 
as much as physicians are, should receive specialized training in 
their craft.96 These criticisms gained traction. The SPC imposed 
education and qualification requirements for judges appointed 
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after January 1, 2002.97 In addition, serving judges had to pass 
internal examinations to continue in their positions. The quality 
and efficiency of adjudication, judicial capacity, and public trust 
in courts were enumerated as the main thrusts of the SPC’s 
fourth five-year reform plan covering 2014 to 2018. 98  To 
improve the judiciary and “retain talent at the adjudication 
frontlines,” in July 2014, the SPC introduced a quota judge 
system limiting the proportion of court personnel authorized to 
hear disputes to 39 percent.99 Staff in courts were reshuffled into 
three categories: judges, judicial assistants, and administrative 
staff. 100  Judges who did not pass internal evaluations were 
transferred to judicial assistance or administrative roles and were 
no longer permitted to decide cases.101 According to statistics 
reported to the National People’s Congress’s Standing 
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Committee’s in November 2017, the total number of judges 
nationwide dropped by 46 percent, from 211,990 to 120,138 
after implementation of the quota judge system.102 
As adjudicatory resources tightened, the amount of 
litigation multiplied. Between 2005 to 2017, the number of cases 
accepted by courts across the country rose dramatically from 
7,984,920 to 22,601,567.103 This explosion in number of cases 
has been attributed to China’s economic growth, increased 
public awareness of law and rights, and state policies promoting 
the rule of law.104 Chinese courts adjusted by “[keeping] an array 
of eligible cases out of the judicial system so that the court 
docket remains manageable and the judicial resources are 
directed to where they are needed the most.”105 “To sufficiently 
safeguard the parties’ litigation rights and effectively solve the 
common people’s ‘difficulty in case filing’,” the SPC in 2015 
instituted a case filing regime, mandating courts to docket all 
properly lodged complaints and explain any refusal. 106  In 
addition, courts are to notify parties of necessary additions or 
revisions altogether.107 These strictures rein in the discretion of 
case filing divisions, which in the past had either ignored 
complaints without hearing from the plaintiffs108 or temporized 
by making successive demands for supplementary materials.109 
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Whereas the courthouse doors are being opened to more 
people than ever, political channels, such as xinfang, for raising 
grievances are being constricted. Dating back to the early 1950s, 
110 xinfang is based on political, rather than judicial, authority. 
Xinfang offices receive complaints, suggestions, and requests 
from the general population through letters (“xin”) or in-person 
visits (“fang”).”111 Millions of petitions are lodged in xinfang 
offices at the national and local levels every year.112 Before the 
“xinfang village” in Beijing was torn down for railway 
construction in 2008, over 10,000 petitioners had amassed and 
had been living there in their quest for justice.113 The popularity 
of xinfang has been attributed to its broad jurisdiction and 
diverse remedies, as xinfang is administered by powerful 
government agencies rather than toothless courts. 114  Another 
possible explanation is a strong cultural tendency for citizens to 
go to government officials to arbitrate their disputes. 115  In 
imperial China, local magistrates were known as “parent 
officials” and discharged both executive and judicial functions. 
They were expected to care for the people under their charge 
who, in turn, owed them obedience. Discontented subjects could 
appeal to higher political authorities, some even making the long 




110 Complaint Bureau Busiest Office in Beijing, CHINA DAILY, Sep. 2, 2007, 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-09/02/content_6142475.htm. 
111 Id.; see also Xinfang Tiaoli (2005) (信访条例（2005）) [Letters and 
Visits Regulation (2005)] (promulgated by the State Council, May 1, 2005, 
effective Oct. 1, 2005), Art. 2 ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Mar. 20, 2005, 4 (China), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/23/content_271.htm. 
112 Complaint Bureau Busiest Office in Beijing, supra note 110; Li Fengjing 
(李逢静), Guojia Xinfangju Fujuzhang: 1 zhi 10 Yuefen Quanguo Xinfang 
Zongliang wei 604 Wanjian (信访局副局长：1 至 10 月份全国信访总量为
604 万件) [The Deputy Chief of State Letters and Visits Bureau: the Total 
Amount of Xinfang Petitions Nationwide was 6.04 million], BEIJING 
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found a contemporary parallel when the former Premier Wen 
Jiabao met with eight petitioners who had journeyed to the 
National Xinfang Bureau in Beijing.116 After recounting to the 
former Premier how his home in Hubei province had been 
illegally demolished, Wang Aiguo, one of the petitioners, was 
confident his travails were at an end.117 Speaking to a reporter, 
Wang confessed that he never expected to be heard by so high 
an official. Premier Wen, he said, was “close to the people and 
dedicated to practical solutions.”118  
Whether the motivation is to sate a public demand for 
legality or to avoid the disturbances precipitated by a case-by-
case approach to handling grievances,119 the central government 
eventually clamped down on the perceived excess of xinfang. In 
2014, to curb the phenomenon of citizens “trusting high-level 
rather than low-level administrators and trusting xinfang rather 
than law,”120 the National Xinfang Bureau announced a policy of 
‘level-by-level visits (zhuji zoufang). To temper incessant 
petitioning, grievants may only ask for an unsatisfactory xinfang 
decision to be reviewed twice. 121  Petitioners were also 
prohibited from bypassing local authorities and appealing 
directly to superior governments. 122  The deputy head of the 
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National Xinfang Bureau, Zhang Enxi, elaborated that these 
policies were designed to “resolve problems legally, timely, and 
locally.”123 Constraints on the use of letters and visits achieved 
the desired consequence of diverting more cases into judicial 
fora. Between greater access to the legal system and the fewer 
venues for xinfang, in 2016 alone, courts at all levels accepted 
16,302,994 complaints, a 12.48 percent increase year-on-year.124 
The explosion in litigation, on the one hand, and the 
thinning of the judicial ranks, on the other, has resulted in a 
situation of “too many cases and too few judges (anduo 
renshao).”125  From January to March 2019, 7.6 million new 
cases were distributed among 125,000 quota judges; an average 
of 61 cases per judge over the period.126 Cases still pending after 
the legally prescribed deadline, reversals on appeals, and 
wrongful judgments are apt to shake public confidence in the 
judicial system.127 The stress felt by judicial officers has also 
become a matter of general concern. Death, illness, and 
resignations of overtired judges were documented by media in 
recent years. For example, “in Miluo, a city in Hunan Province, 
central China, four judges died of illness in 2016 and 2017, and 
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84.5% of judges were found to be in “sub-health status.”128 In 
2017, five quota judges from Sichuan Province passed away; 34 
resigned on medical grounds.129 Citing the death of 85 judges 
between 2013 and 2018, Zhou Qiang called for public attention 
to the welfare of judges.130 
Technology is one antidote to the conundrum of “too 
many cases and too few judges.” For example, to conserve 
judicial time and resources, Wechat portals enable real-time 
communication and document transmission between litigants, 
lawyers, and judges. Powered by artificial intelligence, 
innovations like the 206 System and Xiaozhi accelerate 
proceedings by analyzing case filings, summarizing points of 
trial contention, transcribing hearings, calculating damages, 
finding related cases, and generating depositions. Besides 
boosting judicial efficiency, technology also shapes citizens’ 
perceptions of and attitudes towards the justice system. Courts 
have touted positive feedback on their litigation services.131 A 
lawyer from Guangxi Province was quoted lauding the 
convenience of electronic filing:  
 
I used to go to courts to file complaints. There 
were traffic jams and no spots available for 
parking. I also had to wait in line when I arrived 
in the case filing hall. If any material was 
missing, I had to make another trip. [It] costed 
time and energy. Now I only need around 10 
minutes to submit documents to file a complaint 
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Public Satisfaction Reaches 95%], ZHONGGUO RIBAO WANG, Jan. 14, 2019, 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1622600247710026708&wfr=spider&for=
pc; see also Wu Shunlin, Sifa Fuwu Manyidu Bang Gongbu (司法服务满意
度榜公布 ) [The Satisfaction Rate of Judicial Services is Published], 
NANFANG DUSHI BAO, July 2, 2019, 
https://www.sohu.com/a/324221500_161795. 
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online. The procedure for case filing has been 
simplified significantly.132 
 
The affective dimension of human-computer interaction should 
also not be neglected. Commenting on his first encounter with 
the robot Xiao Yu at a local court in Hebei province, a litigant 
said: “This is my first time filing a complaint [in court]. I saw a 
robot when I arrived. I tried to talk to her and, according to her 
instructions, I successfully completed the filling.”133 “Xiao Yu 
is so adorable,” he added. “Hearing her voice calmed me down 
immediately.”134 For citizens who have no occasion to resort to 
the courts, publication of judgments on the internet could 
strengthen faith in legal institutions by rendering their decisions 
visible and thus examinable. Online transparency—even if 
ultimately little more than a façade—might substitute for judicial 
competence and probity in cultivating public trust in the justice 
system. 
 
B.   Social Harmony and the Rule of Law 
 
On December 13, 1978, in the wake of the Cultural 
Revolution that had upended Chinese law and society, soon-to-
be paramount leader Deng Xiaoping sought to restore order to 
chaos by governing through rules. 135 Pithily encapsulating his 
thoughts in sixteen Chinese characters, he declared that 
 
There should be laws to rely on, laws must be 
followed, the enforcement of laws must be strict, 
and violation of laws must be punished. (“you fa 
 
132  Fei Wenbin, Chen Taiting, Zeng Zhen, Huang Sishi, & Wei Hualing, 
Tamen Zheyang Dazhao Yidong Banan Zhihui Fayuan (他们这样打造移动
办案智慧法院 ) [They Established a Smart Court with a function of 
Mobilized Case Handling in This Way], GUANGXI HIGH PEOPLE’S COURT, 
June 15, 2017, https://www.sohu.com/a/149175908_211448. 
133 Jujiao Zhihui Fayuan Daosu Jiqiren Yunfan Zoujin Qiaodong Renmin 
Fayuan (聚焦智慧法院 导诉机器人“云帆”走进桥东人民法院) [Spotlight 
on Smart Courts: Litigation Guide Robot Yun Fan Walked into Qiaodong 
People’s Court], ZHONGGUO SHANGYE GUANCHA WANG [China Finance 
Observer], July 4, 2018, 
http://www.cnelc.com/text/79/180704/AD100830523_1.html. 
134 Id. 
135 STANLEY B LUBMAN, BIRD IN CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER 
MAO, 130 (1999); see also Carlos W H Lo, Deng Xiaoping’s Ideas on Law: 
China on the Threshold of a Legal Order, 32 ASIAN SURV. 649, 649–501 
(1992). 
2020] COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW 31 
ke yi, you fa bi yi, zhi fa bi yan, wei fa bi jiu”)136 
 
In the years that followed, over a hundred statutes were drafted 
and promulgated by the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee. The Criminal Law was passed in 1979, 
taking effect in 1980. “Build[ing] a socialist country under the 
rule of law” was written into Article 5 of the PRC Constitution 
in 1982.137 In 1986, the General Principles of the Civil Law were 
codified.138 Law schools, suppressed during the upheaval of the 
late 60s and early 70s, reemerged 139  and lawyers, once state 
workers, became members of a licensed profession rendering 
services to paying clients. 140 By 2000, there were more than 
68,000 licensed lawyers in China—a dramatic increase from the 
 
136  Deng Xiaoping, Jiefang Sixiang, Shishi Qiushi, Tuanjie Yizhi 
Xiangqiankan (解放思想，实事求是，团结一致向前看) [Emancipate the 
Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, and Unit as One in Looking to the Future], Dec. 
13, 1978, http://epaper.bingtuannet.com/pad/cont/201808/16/c37410.html.  
137  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (中华人民共和国宪法 ) [The 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (1982 Amendment) 
(promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 
4, 1982). 
138 See Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xingfa (1979 Nian) (中华人民共和国
刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (1979)] (promulgated 
by the National People’s Congress, July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980); see 
also Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通
则) [General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, effective 
Jan. 1, 1987). 
139  Carl Minzner, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Legal Education, 36 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 333, 335 (2013); see also HASSANE CISSE, SAM MULLER, 
CHANTAL THOMAS & WANG CHENGUANG, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REV., 
VOLUME 4: LEGAL INNOVATION AND EMPOWERMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 
(2013) (“overall, the number of graduates from law schools or legal 
institutions in China increased from around 8,000 in 1996 to more than 
135,000 in 2010. There are more than 640 ‘real’ law schools around the 
country, and the legal education market is booming.”). 
140 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lvshi Zanxing Tiaoli (中华人民共和国律
师暂行条例 ) [Interim Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
Lawyers] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, Aug. 26, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1982), Art. 1 (which states 
“lawyers are state legal workers whose tasks are to provide state organs, 
enterprises, social organizations, people’s communes, and citizens with legal 
assistance”); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lvshi Fa (中华人民共和国律
师法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers] (promulgated by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Sep. 1, 2017, 
effective Jan. 1, 2018), Art. 2 (which states “[a] lawyer…means a 
professional who has acquired a lawyer’s practice certificate in accordance 
with law, and is authorized or designated to provide the parties with legal 
services.”). 
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212 counted in 1979.141 As part of the revival of law and legal 
institutions, citizens were encouraged to learn their rights and to 
vindicate them. Harkening back to the legal popularization 
campaigns of the 50s, study groups were organized to digest and 
debate the 1982 Constitution and public trials served both 
deterrent and didactic purposes. But the government also turned 
to new media to bring law to the masses. Films educated and 
entertained while legal knowledge contests allowed ordinary 
citizens to showcase their achievements in learning.142    
Ruling through law restored the party-state’s authority 
and legitimacy in the decades following the Cultural Revolution. 
It also returned the lives of the citizenry to a state of normalcy. 
But enthusiasm for legal reform waned in the decade between 
2003 and 2013. A rise in mass discontent incited, perhaps, by 
blinkered attention to individual entitlements, the national 
leadership articulated a vision of a harmonious society. The 
millions of petitions every year attacking judicial decisions 
illustrated the dangers of rigidly adhering to legal procedures and 
norms.143 A more flexible, relationship-oriented, approach was 
called for: stability was to be privileged over legality and 
 
141 Zhang Yu, Cong 0 Ren dao 36.5 Wanren, Lvshiye Sishinian Fashengle 
Shenme (从 0 人到 36.5 万人，律师业四十年发生了什么) [From 0 to 365 
Thousand People, What Changes did It Happen in Legal Profession during 
the Past 40 Years?], DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL SYSTEM NET, Aug. 6, 2018, 
http://kuaibao.qq.com/s/20180806A0E3T200?refer=spider. 
142  JENNIFER ALTEHENGER, LEGAL LESSONS: POPULARIZING LAWS IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1989 234, 237—38 (2018). 
143 Chinese courts received over 9 million xinfang petitions in 2000 and 2001, 
exceeding the number of cases accepted by a large margin. Law Yearbook of 
China (2001–2002); In a survey fielded to 632 villagers who were filing 
xinfang petition in Beijing, 63.4 percent of respondents had sought resolution 
in courts. Yu Jianrong, Zhongguo Xinfang Zhidu Gaige (中国信访制度批判
) [Reform of Xinfang system in China], 2 ZHONGGUO GAIGE 26, 27 [China 
Reform] (2005); Yu Jianrong, Zhongguo de Saoluan Shijian yu Guanzhi 
Weiji: Zai Jiazhou Daxue Bokeli Fenxiao de Yanjiang (中国的骚乱事件与
管治危机：在加州大学伯克利分校的演讲) [Riot Incidents and Control 
Crisis: Speech at UC Berkeley on October 30, 2007], SHEHUI XUEJIA 
CHAZUO [Teahouse for Sociologists] 26, 26 (2008) (“In fact, over the recent 
ten years, the number of collective action events happened in China rapidly 
surged. In 1993, there were 8708 events nationwide and the trend continues 
to accelerate afterwards. The number of events exceeded 32,000 in 1999, 
60,000 in 2003, 74,000 in 2004, and 87,000 in 2005, which increased about 
ten times”); see also Michelson Ethan, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda: 
Grievances and Appeals to the Official Justice System in Rural China, 72 AM. 
SOC. REV. 459, 459–85 (2007); see also Lianjiang Li & Kevin O’Brien, 
Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China, 22 MODERN 
CHINA 28, 28–61 (1996). 
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mediation preferred to adjudication. 144  Described by one 
commentator as China’s “turn against law,” 145  juridical 
institutions prevailed on litigants to eschew legal verdicts in 
favor of mutual compromise. Beginning in 2004, the SPC, in a 
series of guidance documents, advocated mediation as a means 
of promoting efficiency, securing voluntary compliance from 
parties and, more importantly, maintaining social harmony.146 
Lower courts were exhorted to devote special effort to mediating 
nine types of cases, including collective lawsuits that pose a 
threat to stability and social harmony, sensitive cases attracting 
public attention, and retrial or xinfang cases provoking strong 
emotions and intense conflicts. 147  The imperative to mediate 
 
144 Li Xilian, Fayuan Tiaojie Youxian de Lengsikao (法院调解优先的冷思
考) [Contemplation of Prioritizing Court Medition], FALV KEXUE [Legal 
Science] 12, 12–14 (2010). 
145 Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 
(2011). 
146 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Minshi Tiaojie Gongzuo 
Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院民事调解工作若
干问题的规定 ) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court concerning 
Several Issues of the Civil Mediation Work of the People’s Courts] 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Sep. 16, 2004, effective Nov. 
1, 2004); see also Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Fahui Susong 
Tiaojie zai Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexieshehui zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan 
Yijian (最高人民法院关于进一步发挥诉讼调解在构建社会主义和谐社
会中积极作用的若干意见) [Several Opinions of the Supreme People’ Court 
on Further Displaying the Positive Roles of Court Mediation in the Building 
of a Socialist Harmonious Society] (promulgated by the SPC, Mar. 1, 2007, 
effective Mar. 1, 2007), Art. 2 (“Court mediation is … an important 
component of harmonious adjudication. In recent years, people’s courts … 
established the principle of ‘mediating when possible, judging when 
necessary, combining mediating with judgments, and solving the dispute once 
the case is concluded’ as the guideline for civil trial work.”); see also Guanyu 
Jinyibu Guanche “Tiaojie Youxian Tiaopan Jiehe” Gongzuo Yuanze de 
Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步贯彻“调解优先调判结合”工作原则的若干意
见 ) [Several Opinions on Further Implementing the Work Principle of 
“Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with Judgment”] 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, June 28, 2010, effective June 
28, 2010) (“Mediation is a judgment of high quality and high effectiveness, 
and mediation ability is a high level judicial ability. Mediation is conducive 
to the elimination of social conflicts and the realization of the resolution of 
all disputes upon close of a case, conducive to the restoration of the relations 
among the parties concerned and the realization of harmony.”). 
147  Guanyu Jinyibu Guanche “Tiaojie Youxian Tiaopan Jiehe” Gongzuo 
Yuanze de Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步贯彻“调解优先调判结合”工作原则
的若干意见) [Several Opinions on Further Implementing the Work Principle 
of “Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with Judgment”] 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, June 28, 2010, effective June 
28, 2010), Art. 2 (4).  
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rather than adjudicate was rendered concrete through the SPC’s 
Case Quality Assessment System. The mediation rate became—
and remains—a key indicator for evaluating judges and ranking 
courts.148 
While a reaction against the perceived excesses wrought 
by law, this shift also reprised the “Ma Xiwu” style of judging 
heralded in the early years of the People’s Republic. Praised as 
a model for the ages, the eponymous judge “play[ed] multiple 
roles of the adjudicator, the mediator, the educator of the law, as 
well as the vanguard of harmony and stability within the local 
community.”149 
Ma Xiwu style stressed the primacy of the mass 
line over positive law, and the common wisdom 
of rural judicial cadres, who typically had little 
to no formal education. It required judicial 
cadres to adopt flexible and simplified 
procedures, and to venture forth from the 
courtroom to investigate personally the 
circumstances behind the cases before them. 
They were supposed to seek the opinions of the 
masses so that they might better understand 
pertinent facts and the potential ramifications of 
their rulings, grasp the conjunctions between law 
and local society, spread the teachings of Party 
 
148  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Kaizhan Anjian Zhiliang Pinggu 
Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) (最高人民法院关于开展案件质量评
估工作的指导意见（试行）) [Guiding Opinion of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Carrying out the Case Quality Evaluation (for Trial Implementation) 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 11, 2008, effective Jan. 
11, 2008); see also, Renmin Fayuan Anjian Zhiliang Pinggu Zhishu Bianzhi 
Banfa (Shixing) (人民法院案件质量评估值数编制办法（试行） ) 
[Measures for the Indexing of Case Quality Evaluation of the People’s Courts 
(for Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, 
June 15, 2013, effective July 1, 2013); see also Zhongguo Renmin 
Gongheguo Faguanfa (中国人民共和国法官法) [Judges Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Apr. 23, 2019, effective Oct. 1, 2019), Art. 45.  
149  PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL 
JUSTICE: A PROCEDURALIST DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE 46—47 (Brill Nijhoff 
2017); see also Glenn Tiffert, Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese 
Characteristics: A New Genealogy, in SOCIALIST LAW IN SOCIALIST EAST 
ASIA 72, 81 (Hualing Fu et al. eds., 2018) (“Moreover, time and time again 
the CCP promoted the Ma Xiwu style as an antidote to the legal formalism 
and professionalisation associated with the rule of law. The two opposing 
paradigms of justice have long co-existed in an unstable balance, each rising 
or falling in inverse relation to the other as political winds shift.”) 
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policy, and deliver more timely and responsive 
justice.150 
Up until “the late 1980s, the political ideology of the CCP 
demanded that courts settle disputes using ‘democratic 
methods’—that is, by persuading and educating disputants rather 
than adjudicating their disputes according to established legal 
principles.”151 But few can truly emulate the deeds ascribed to 
Ma Xiwu, and when judicial salaries and promotions were 
tethered to mediation rates, many judges sought to improve their 
prospects by “persuad[ing], plead[ing], and even forc[ing] the 
litigation parties to accept mediation result.”152 Writing in 2018, 
Li Yedan, Joris Kocken, and Benjamin van Rooij described an 
intermediate court where “[o]n the 21st of each month, the 
evaluation results punctually landed on each judge’s table, 
including their results of mediation rate. The judges’ names were 
listed in descending order, from the best to the worst.”153 Under 
such pressure, judges in the court promoted settlement at all 
stages of the litigation process.154  
More generally, “strategies with compulsory elements, 
such as persuasion, procedural delay, and the threat of 
unfavorable judgment,” were frequently deployed “to force 
litigants to accept mediation.”155 One grassroots judge explained 
to a Peking University researcher that compared to formal 
judgments, mediation agreements were easier to issue and 
enforce since they did not have to abide by formal procedures 
and were not ordinarily subject to appeal, retrial, or reversal.156 
Even if “the parties, in general, do not request for mediation, and 
seek justice through judgments, they have limited knowledge 
 
150 Tiffert, supra note 148, at 81. 
151  Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, The Development of Public Interest 
Litigation in China, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 9, 28–29 (2010). 
152 Randall Peerenboom & Xin He, Dispute Resolution in China: Patterns, 
Causes and Prognosis, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 1, 27 (2009). 
153 Li Yedan, Joris Kocken & Benjamin van Rooji, Understanding China’s 
Court Mediation Surge: Insights from a Local Court, 43 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 58, 66 (2018). 
154 Id. at 66–76. 
155 Liu Sida, The Shape of Chinese Law, 1 PEKING U. L.J. 415, 420 (2014). 
156 Jiang Shigong, Falv shi Ruhe Shijian de – Yiqi Xiangcun Tiaojiean de 
Fenxi (法律是如何实践的—一起乡村调解案的分析 ) [How is Law 
Implemented: The Analysis of a Village Civil Mediation Case], in TIAOJIE, 
FAZHI YU XIANDAIXING [Mediation, Legality and Modernity: Medition in 
China] (Jiang Shigong ed., 2000); see Zhang Yanli, Fayuan Tiaojie Qianzhi 
Moshi Xuanze: Minshi Shenqian Tiaojie (法院调解前置模式选择：民事审
前调解) [Analysis about the Model Choice of Court Pre-Mediation: Civil 
Pretrial Mediation], FAXUE 106, 106 (2011). 
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about legal rules and procedures, and can still be persuaded to 
accept mediation results.”157 Judges arrange ex-parte meetings 
to urge and, sometimes, hector parties into mediated outcomes. 
Illustrative of the practice of “back to back” (beikaobei) 
mediation, 158  judges presiding over personal lending cases 
might intimate to defendants the possibility of higher damages 
being found at trial while separately telling plaintiffs about 
difficulties of enforcing court awards.159 Judges foist settlements 
agreements onto the parties, even when they know the possibility 
of the contractual terms being fulfilled to be remote.160 Parties 
who agree in the moment often come to regret their decisions.161 
And even when the parties refuse to budge, statements made by 
judges in the course of mediation cast doubts over the fairness of 
later proceedings.162  
The uneasy relationship between mediated justice and 
the rule of law becomes even more fraught when coaxing shades 
into coercion. Yang Su and Xin He vividly document the 
Gaolaida case where seventy-seven workers sought unpaid 
overtime wages from a hardware and plastic manufacturer.163 To 
pacify the angry employers and force the company to the 
mediation table, the court arbitrarily froze the company’s cash 
accounts and admonished corporate executives “to embark on 
 
157 Id. 
158 Liu, supra note 155, at 427—28; see also MINSHI SUSONG LVSHI SHIWU 
(XIUDINGBEN) (民事诉讼律师实务 ) [The Lawyer’s Practice in Civil 
Litigation] (Tan Fang eds., 2016). 
159 Shao Liuyi, Beilun yu Biran: Fayuan Tiaojie de Huigui (2003–2012) (悖
论与必然：法院调解的回归) [Paradox and Necessity: The Return of Court 
Mediation (2003-2012)], 5 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [ECUPL 
Journal] 112, 122 (2013). 
160 Li Hao, Dangxia Fayuan Tiaojie zhong Yige Zhide Jingti de Xianxiang: 
Tiaojie Anjian Daliang Jinru Qiangzhi Zhixing Yanjiu (当下法院调解中一
个值得警惕的现象：调解案件大量进入强制执行研究) [The Alarming 
Phenomenon in Court Mediation: Research 4on Compulsory Enforcement in 
A Large Number of Mediation Cases], 1 FAXUE 139, 144 (2012) (“In some 
cases, where debtors did not have any ability of repayment and judges knew 
that, even if a mediation agreement is reached, it would be impossible to 
enforce the agreement. However, considering the mediation rate 
requirements, courts nonetheless insisted to mediate.”) 
161  Sun Zhaohui, Lun Susong zhong Budang Tiaojie Xingwei dui Sifa 
Gongxinli de Sunhai (论诉讼中不当调解行为对司法公信力的损害) [The 
Damages of Improper Mediation Acts during Litigation Imposed on Public 
Trust in the Judiciary], YUNNAN DAXUE XUEBAO FAXUEBAN [Journal of 
Yunnan University (Law Edition) 115, 116 (2015). 
162 Id.; Li, supra note 160, at 141. 
163 Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor 
Protest in South China, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157, 166–67 (2010). 
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and commit to the success of a judicial mediation.”164 Strong-
arm tactics such as these not only deny the parties’ autonomy to 
resolve their disputes as they wish but also deprive them of the 
opportunity to protect their own interests through 
negotiation. 165 As implemented by judicial authorities, the 
mediatory paradigm is widely criticized for pursuing social 
harmony at expense of lawful rights and public trust in the 
courts.166 Rather than “make the public feel fairness and justice 
from every judicial case,”167 the syndrome of “endless mediation 
and no judgment” (“jiutiao bupan”) has frustrated litigants in 
search of justice. 
The view that the inherent contradiction between 
mediation and adjudication cannot be squared appears to be 
universally acknowledged. 168  But technology promises to 
reconcile the two by encouraging parties to bargain in the 
shadow of the law.169 In contrast to the subjective prognoses of 
motivated judges, the evaluations performed by intelligent 
machines might seem more objective and legitimate. And rather 
than cajole or bully litigants into settlement, these artificial 
counselors proffer summaries of the perils of litigation, précis 
that are ostensibly backed by dispassionate consideration of 
legal sources and materials. In so doing, they recast mediation, 
not as the abnegation of law, but as a dispute resolution 
mechanism that acknowledges legal entitlements and liabilities. 
Indeed, Man Zhiqiang, president of Xinyuan People’s Court in 
Shandong Province the assessment of litigation risk to be a form 
 
164 Id. 
165 Li Xilian, Fayuan Tiaojie Youxian de Lengsikao (法院调解优先的冷思
考) [Contemplation of Prioritizing Court Medition], FALV KEXUE [Legal 
Science] 12, 15 (2010). 
166 Li, supra note 160, at 141. 
167 Yang Lina & Cheng Hongyi, Xi Jinping: Nuli Rang Renmin zai Meiyige 
Sifa Anjian zhong Douneng Ganshoudao Gongping Zhengyi (习近平：努力
让人民在每一个案件中都能感受到公平正义) [Xi Jinping: Strive to Make 
the Public Feel Fairness and Justice in Every Judicial Case], CPC NEWS, Jan. 
8, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0108/c64094-20125182.html. 
168 Huang Min, Chen Xiaoli, Guanyu Fayuan Minshi Tiaojie Jiazhi de Sikao 
(关于法院民事调解价值的思考 ) [Contemplating the Value of Civil 
Mediations in Courts], CHINA COURT, July 22, 20008, 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2008/07/id/314025.shtml; see also 
Xiao Yang, Rang “Dongfang Jingyan” Chongfang Guangcai: Zai Yatai 
Shouxi Dafaguan Huiyi Shang de Yanjiang (让“东方经验”重放光彩：在亚
太首席大法官会议上的演讲) (Let the “Eastern Experience” Shine Again: 
Speech Presented at the Conference of Chief Justices of the Asia-Pacific in 
2004), 5 PANJIE YANJIU [Studies of Precedent and Mediation], 1, 1–5, (2004). 
169 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
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of “ideological work with the masses.” “After receiving the 
[litigation] risk assessment report, paying special attention to the 
five aspects of [litigation] costs, over 90 percent of disputants 
were pacified and able to analyse and resolve problems calmly 
and rationally,” Man attested. 170  As compared to judicial 
suasion, algorithmic evaluations might be a more principled–and 
successful—approach to encouraging mediation. That, at least, 
seems to be the lesson of Beijing Daily’s article featuring Mr. 
Zhang, a corporate legal representative. Standing in front of a 
litigation guidance system in Beijing’s Fangshan District, Mr 
Zhang gushed: “With this machine, there is no need for us to 
seek a lawyer for consultation. It will save us so much energy 
and preserve judicial resources for courts.” 171  The computer 
estimating a high probability of the company losing its lawsuit, 
Mr. Zhang put in a request for mediation straightaway.172  
 
C.   Legal Consciousness and Party Hegemony 
 
The People’s Republic has embarked on several 
campaigns to popularize laws and to encourage citizens to “use 
the law as their weapon” in the face of oppression. At the same 
time, it struggles mightily to fix the meaning of the laws and the 
ways the laws are invoked. Sometimes, state media profile and 
praise those who render legal assistance to the poor and 
defenseless. At other times, government agencies police and 
persecute advocates who resort to extreme tactics in furtherance 
of their cause or who galvanize plaintiffs to seek policy change. 
Government attitude towards rights-defense or weiquan 
activities fluctuate depending on time, place, circumstance, and 
hierarchy. When people “use the law as their weapon,” private 
wrongs and public injustices are addressed in a manner and 
forum prescribed by the state. But law can also be invoked to 
crystallize grievances against the state and tame its power. The 
political ambivalence of weiquan is mirrored in its semantic 
ambiguity. Praised in official discourse as means for individuals 
to safeguard their legitimate interests, the concept of weiquan 
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was later appropriated by civil society to challenge the regime, 
particularly on questions of human rights. 173  But even as its 
valence shifted, the term weiquan was never repudiated by state 
actors. It remains part of the Ministry of Justice’s language and 
policy, even as rights defenders are suppressed in the name of 
public security.174  
The example of “barefoot lawyer” Zhou Guangli is 
illustrative. Barefoot lawyers have no formal qualifications; they 
are citizen representatives who volunteer to help others reclaim 
their rights.175 Like many barefoot lawyers, Zhou learnt law by 
doing it. His foray into weiquan was precipitated by a street 
event popularizing the Administrative Litigation Law. To bring 
law to the countryside, judges from the administrative division 
of the Yanggu County court distributed pamphlets to passer-bys, 
declaring that ordinary people can sue the government.”176 His 
curiosity piqued, Zhou urged a neighbor who had been fined by 
the township authorities to seek redress in the county court. 
Initially belligerent, the township government eventually caved, 
returning the contested money before the judicial hearing. 177 
This modest success launched a career that spanned 1,674 
lawsuits between September 1995 and December 2005. 178 
Bullied by local official in the early years, Zhou slowly rose to 
prominence. Villagers sought him out and his exploits were 
recounted in the mainstream press. His influence became such 
that in November 1999, the Yanggu County Government 
convened a workshop on the “Zhou Guangli Phenomenon” 
which it reproved. In September 2000, however, a joint 
investigation by the municipal, prefecture, and county 
governments established that the Zhou Guangli Phenomenon 
“was beneficial to society and was well-trusted and welcomed 
by the masses.” 179  This sort of activity should be “properly 
handle[d], guide[d], and regulate[d].” 180  In view of these 
conclusions, the country government left Zhou to his own 
devices and his endeavors grew in size and scope. Eventually, 
however, the affirmation of the joint investigation receded and 
the tribulations of barefoot lawyering took a physical and 
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emotional toll on Zhou. After being beaten unconscious by court 
police in June 2006, Zhou decided to give up his lay practice.  
Zhou Guangli’s story is not unique among legal activists. 
The Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counselling and Service 
Center (Zhongze Center) was, in a previous incarnation, the 
Peking University’s Centre for Women’s Law Studies and Legal 
Services (Peking University Center). Founded by one-time 
journalist Guo Jianmei in 1995 after she attended the United 
Nation’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing,181 the 
Peking University Center specialized in women’s rights, 
litigating for change and lobbying for reform. Among other 
social problems, the Center attended to the plights of villagers 
deprived of land in their birthplace after marriage, employees 
dismissed after falling pregnant, and victims of domestic 
violence and sexual assault.182 As part of its litigation strategy, 
the Center publicized its cases, organizing press events and 
seminars to bring public and academic opinion to bear on local 
judges.183 The Center also gathered experts to analyze laws and 
regulations for constitutional violations and propose legislative 
revisions. 184  The Center became widely acclaimed and its 
director won accolades for her vision and dedication. Nominated 
for the Nobel Prize in 2005, Guo was featured in a June 2009 
China Daily article that described her as “one of China’s leading 
public interest lawyers.”185 The party-owned outlet recounted 
her struggle on behalf of women, highlighting her receipt of the 
2007 Global Women Leadership Award.  
Indeed, advocacy of women’s rights is ideologically 
orthodox—the Party has historically championed gender 
equality,186 proclaiming that “women hold up half the sky.”187 
But the ability of the Peking University Center to galvanize 
domestic support, rally civil society, and attract independent 
funding unsettled the establishment.188 The government became 
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increasingly less tolerant of the Center’s activities.189 In 2010, 
Peking University, buckling to external pressure, terminated the 
affiliation of the Center which was then relocated to an 
apartment in north Beijing and registered as the Zhongze Center. 
The Zhongze Center continued to provide legal aid to women, 
even collaborating with provincial Women’s Federations on 
projects,190 but the respite was short-lived. In 2016, barely four 
months after China touted its progress at a United Nations event 
commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Fourth 
Women’s Conference, the Zhongze Women’s Center was 
ordered to close.191 A post on its website said it was “tak[ing] a 
rest.”192 It never returned.  
The fates of Zhou Guangli and the Zhongze Center 
demonstrate how the assertion of rights espoused and promoted 
by the party-state might be construed as politically dangerous 
when it becomes too disruptive or inspirational. The Xi 
administration’s strategy of “[p]roactive repression” operates by 
“completely dismantl[ing] advocacy organizations and 
clip[ping] their ties to activist networks before the outbreak of 
organized mass incidents.”193 Courts for their part have mediated 
the vindication of the lawful rights of particular litigants, on the 
one hand, and the imperative to quell organized dissent, on the 
other, by atomizing collective actions. Since 1991, the Chinese 
Law of Civil Procedure has provided for the filing of joint 
lawsuits, 194  although class representation was selectively 
permitted before then. The An Yue Rice-Seed Case was the first 
mass dispute handled on a representative basis.195 In 1985, 1,569 
farmers in Sichuan Province sued to recover their losses on a 
seed contract.196 According to one observer, the government, 
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“fearful of unrest . . . pushed local courts to handle the cases 
quickly by trying them together rather than individually,”197 and 
eight of the plaintiffs were eventually allowed to prosecute 
claims on behalf of the group.198 This procedural device was 
invoked several times before its eventual codification. 199 
Articles 54 and 55 of the Civil Procedure Legislation now 
contemplate class actions involving a fixed and indeterminate 
number of plaintiffs respectively. Animating these provisions is 
the notion that class actions “serv[e] as a safety valve for a 
widening range of popular complaints”—it is better for disputes 
to be settled by talk than through violence.200  
But class actions were also perceived as dangerous to 
social stability.201 Exemplary of this suspicion is the Guangxi 
High People’s Court’s 2003 Circular to inferior courts directing 
them to reject, for the time being, cases falling into one of 
thirteen categories.202 Included in the suspension were claims 
against local government agencies or enterprises that fail to 
spend the money collected from their employees for the purposes 
advertised, complaints of market manipulation and insider 
dealing on the securities market, and grievances arising out of 
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corporation-wide retrenchment or wage delays.203 As explained 
by the high people’s court to the media, such disputes were ill-
suited to a judicial forum because they “involved a large number 
of appellants” and tended to “be highly sensitive and attract 
public attention”.204 More than two years later, the SPC issued 
the “Notice Regarding Problems with the Acceptance of Class 
Action Lawsuits by the People’s Courts.”205 Promulgated on 30 
December 2005, the Notice restricted collective lawsuits to the 
basic people’s courts; the high people’s courts were to entertain 
such actions only in special circumstances and even then only 
with the approval of the SPC. According to its drafter, the Notice 
was designed to “nip collective disputes in the bud.”206  
 
In exercising their virtually unfettered discretion to 
atomize class actions, local courts seek, among other things, to 
quash any risk of group dissent.207 Collective disputes that pit 
ordinary citizens against well-connected elites might spiral out 
of control, spilling out of the courtroom and into the streets. As 
evidenced by the Guang Xi High Court’s 2003 Circular, large-
scale labor incidents are deemed especially threatening to social 
stability: “as rights infringements, such as arrears of wages and 
overtime payments, are often factory-wide, they often engender 
‘contentious gatherings’ of workers; these gatherings are likely 
to escalate into unrest and, moreover, to harbor elements that 
might generate new dynamics of labor action.” 208  Collective 
workplace disputes are “incessantly” dismantled.209 During the 
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financial crisis of 2009, judges were dispatched to sites of labor 
confrontation to defuse tensions by funneling disputes into the 
legal system. 210  These claims were then disaggregated and 
processed at the individual level.211 Over the years, the “active 
fragmentation of disputes by arbitrators and other government 
units tasked with social responsibility maintenance” has resulted 
in a “collapse in the number of collective disputes going through 
the formal systems of arbitration and litigation.” 212  As 
documented by Mary Gallagher, in 2011, only 2% of all 
arbitrated labor disputes were resolved as class actions. 213  
The party-state’s wariness of organized contention is, 
perhaps, reflected most clearly in the 2006 Guiding Opinion on 
Lawyers Handling Mass Litigation.214 Promulgated by the All 
China Lawyers Association—a national body that regulates the 
legal profession—the Guiding Opinion addresses the 
professional responsibilities of attorneys acting in collective 
lawsuits. “Lawyers,” the Guiding Opinion proclaims, “must 
safeguard the country’s stability” and “the proper handling of 
mass litigation is essential to the successful construction of a 
socialist harmonist society.” Specifically, only lawyers 
possessing “good political quality” and “abundant experience” 
may conduct the initial consultation, and the assent of three 
partners is required for a firm to take up a mass litigation, defined 
as a case involving ten or more plaintiffs. In a striking vitiation 
of the lawyer-client privilege, attorneys must report to the 
relevant authorities happenings that may cause the dispute to 
“intensify” and litigants whose activities threaten to disrupt 
social stability. Lawyers are also admonished not to stir up 
news” and to “exercise caution” when communicating with 
foreign organizations and media. A lawyer who takes on mass 
litigation is bound to inform the local lawyers association; a law 
firm that does so must keep its supervising lawyers association 
apprised. 
In the eye of the regime, the legal apparatus protects and 
placates citizens but legal actors may catalyze and coordinate 
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dissent. Technology alleviates this tension in authoritarian 
legalism by bringing law—and courts—closer to the people, and 
in so doing reduce the need for individuals to rely on others, be 
they friends or colleagues, volunteers or professionals. By 
helping citizens know and claim their rights, the legal system 
broadens popular access to justice. At the same time, however, 
it inhibits the coalescence of grievances and dampens the 
centrality of rights advocates. Villagers able to contest an 
administrative fine on their mobile phones will be less likely to 
consult neighbors like Zhou Guangli. Women able to sue 
employers for gender discrimination through Wechat will be less 
inclined to turn to non-governmental organizations like the 
Zhongze Center. 
Disintermediation of the legal profession and its allies is 
not an idle or fantastical possibility. A dearth of plaintiffs has 
plagued lawyers pursuing social change through litigation.215 
Victims are not especially keen on being the face of a public 
interest lawsuit that seeks to “make the case educational for the 
general public, a deterrent for offending parties and persuasive 
to decision-makers.”216 Take for example Beijing Yirenping, an 
anti-discrimination group that fights, among other things, for 
carriers of the Hepatitis-B virus (HBV). By articulating the legal 
injury suffered by HBV-carriers, Yirenping gives them a voice 
in law and policy.217 Nevertheless, Yirenping struggles to find 
plaintiffs. 218  To overcome this difficulty, Yirenping’s 
“prevailing practice . . . is to demand as much monetary 
[compensation] as possible” so as to give victims a strong 
financial incentive to step forward.219 Yirenping also mitigates 
the emotional burden on victims by protecting their identities.220 
The organization has successfully obtained judicial assistance on 
this front; when it comes to media coverage, “Yirenping insists 
on the use of pseudonym[s] for its plaintiffs,” and photographs 
are taken so as to render their faces unrecognizable. 221 While 
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Yirenping is sensitive to economic and privacy considerations, a 
low-cost, low-exposure, alternative for seeking justice may 
dissuade plaintiffs from turning to rights defense groups. The 
lack of a critical mass will make it difficult for such 
organizations to cultivate networks and push for systematic 
change. 
Law is a double-edged sword for the party-state. The 
justice system pacifies disagreements and keeps the peace, but it 
also sustains intermediaries who bring claimants together and 
thereby build a constituency. Deliberately or organically, the 
technologization of the justice system enhances authoritarian 
legality by promoting legal consciousness and mobilization at 
the retail, not wholesale, level, thereby assuring the hegemony 
of the party-state vis-à-vis civil society and the legal community. 
 
III. SOME EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS 
 
So far, we have indicated how technology alleviates—
even reconciles—the tensions defining Chinese law and legal 
institutions today and articulated its promise and perils. But as 
Professor Zhu Suli remarked in a lecture addressing the shadow 
cast by politics on judicial reform and independence in China, 
“conclusions  . . . cannot be reached simply through debates; they 
will come as the result of empirical research, which requires 
time.”222 Similarly, the overall impact of technologization on 
justice and its administration in the People’s Republic cannot be 
determined by reasoning theoretically or in the abstract. Will the 
integration of artificial intelligence into judicial operations 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of courts? Will it diminish the 
role of advocates in dispute resolution, rendering the legal order 
more state-dominated and less pluralistic? These questions—and 
others— cannot be fully addressed in the absence of data.  
As a first step, we canvass the thoughts of netizens and 
legal aid seekers on the technologization of the legal system. The 
opinions of netizens are valuable because the internet is, perhaps, 
the most influential forum for public discourse in China.223 The 
perspectives of legal aid seekers are also important because they 
are active participants in rather than passive observers of the 
litigation process. As prospective claimants, their reception of 
technological innovations in the law have far-reaching 
implications for socio-political order. In sum, although internet 
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users and legal aid seekers do not exhaust the populace, they are 
among the prime audiences and beneficiaries of the Chinese 
quest for digital justice and smart courts.  
Although the questions we posed were not especially 
sensitive politically, there lurks the possibility of citizens 
misrepresenting their views to conform to the party-state’s 
narratives and ideologies. 224  Whereas evidence about the 
prevalence and magnitude of political wariness in China remains 
mixed,225 past research suggests that self-censorship, rather than 
false reporting, is the preferred strategy of those whose attitudes 
and beliefs deviate from official discourse.226 To mitigate any 
impact of political wariness on our findings, non-response 
options were offered throughout.  
 
A.   Netizens 
 
In early 2020, we fielded an online survey to a sample of 
1050 respondents drawn by Qualtrics. Subjects recruited from 
an internet platform are not nationally representative. First, 
internet users are appreciably different from non-users. As a 
group, the former is younger, more educated, and more socially-
connected than the latter.227 Compared to the general population, 
netizens are less trusting of the government, expect to have a 
greater voice in public affairs, and are more likely to dissent from 
the government’s position.228 Moreover, there is the problem of 
self-selection lurking in the background. For example, internet 
users who choose to participate in an online survey may be more 
vocal or invested than others who opt out. This concern, 
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however, might not be too grave. Previous research found a 
survey of online volunteers to be reflective of the attitudes of the 
internet users on a range of social and political issues when 
appropriately weighted.229  
Like other studies conducted via an online platform, our 
respondents are disproportionately male, urban, and young even 
when compared to the universe of internet users in China.230 
Raking is a statistical method that assigns weights to individual 
observations so as to bring the marginal distributions of the 
demographic variables in the sample closer to those in the 
population. Although the raking algorithm was implemented 
post-data collection, it did not alter the tenor of our findings 
which are presented in unadjusted form here. 
 
 Internet Population231 Qualtrics Sample 
Sex 
Female 47.6% 45.0% 
Male  52.4% 55.1% 
Residence 
Rural 26.3% 7.0% 
Urban 73.7% 93.0% 
Age 
20—29 31.1% 36.1% 
30—39  29.9% 41.7% 
40—49  21.8% 18.7% 
50—59  8.5% 3.0% 




While the disjunct between expectation and experience 
could induce “disillusionment” and a loss of faith in the legal 
system,232 we found that netizens who participated in a lawsuit 
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before were generally satisfied by the resolutions achieved. 






Overall, surveyed netizens were broadly aware of 
initiatives to digitize the legal system. 88.1% of respondents 
heard of judicial decisions being published on the internet; 
56.1% of them have, in fact, consulted these online judgments. 
In addition, 44.9% of respondents have used a mobile 
application to access legal information or services. These 
applications encompass both commercially marketed products 
such as Fasiji (“Legal Driver”), Fayuanbao (“Legal Aid 
Treasure”),233 and Koudailvshi (“Pocket Lawyer”),234 as well as 
official platforms hosted by courts on their WeChat public 
accounts. Respondents were also receptive to artificially 
intelligent legal advice. 89.7% of netizens surveyed expressed 
interest in having machines predict the outcomes of their legal 
disputes. At the same time, however, they were skeptical about 
the ability of computers to replace lawyers. In the event of 
disagreement between an algorithm and an attorney, 56.0% of 
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would trust the latter and 26.0% the former; 18.0% were 
ambivalent. Beyond reservations about technological 
capabilities, internet users listed personal accountability, 
professional knowledge, practical know-how, mental agility, 
and the subjectivity of law as reasons for preferring human to 
artificial counsel. The minority who favored the algorithm cited 
its impartiality and precision. In their eyes, the absence of 
interests or emotions made the machine’s conclusions more 
objective and trustworthy. 
Despite the general sense that computer algorithms were 
not perfect substitutes for human lawyers, technology was 
overwhelmingly perceived to be salutary for law and legal 
institutions. 90.8% of respondents believed the digitization and 
publication of judicial documents to have increased public 
confidence in the administration of justice. 4.5% felt differently 
while 4.8% were unsure. The naysayers doubted the 
correspondence between rhetoric and reality, referencing 
political control of the judiciary and differential standards for 
elites. Surveyed netizens were also generally hopeful about 
impact of artificial intelligence on judicial decision-making. 
87.7% of respondents thought that the introduction of big data 
and machine learning would enhance the determinacy of legal 





B.   Legal Aid Seekers 
 
Between end 2019 and early 2020, we also conducted in-
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person interviews of 114 legal aid seekers. Interviewees were 
randomly selected from among the clients of a legal aid clinic 
operating in Shanghai. Not everyone had a live dispute that could 
potentially escalate to legal action. Some visited the legal aid 
center to educate themselves about the law. But the fact that they 
did so indicates a greater level of engagement with the legal 
system than the average citizen. To protect safeguard privacy 
and encourage candor, interviewees were not asked for 
potentially identifying information, including their date of birth 
or household registration. We observed, however, that a 
substantial number of legal aid seekers were from the older 
generation. 
Although the same questionnaire was read to all 
interviewees, interactions ranged from ten-minute transactions 
to hour-long discussions. Legal aid seekers differed in the 
amount of time and the enthusiasm they had for the study. Some 
were eager to the point of garrulity; others were quietly reticent 
or visibly harried. Although we tried as far as possible to 
standardize the formulation and delivery of questions, 
interviewees occasionally strayed off-topic and some were more 
anxious to tell their own stories rather than respond to specific 
queries. The quality and number of germane answers thus varied 
between interviewees and across questions. A few general 
themes, however, emerged from our conversations. 
First, as compared to netizens, a smaller proportion of 
legal aid seekers were aware of court documents, including 
judgments, being made available online; 46 had heard of this 
development whereas 68 had not. But legal aid seekers on the 
whole reacted positively to the availability of such resources. Of 
110 responsive interviewees, 83 agreed that the online disclosure 
and accessibility of judicial product on the internet has enhanced 
public confidence in the administration of justice. In discussion, 
47 of them spontaneously raised issues of access and 
accountability. The fact that judicial opinions were available on 
the internet for all to study, they felt, made resort to law more 
convenient and less imposing. “Chinese people have the 
impression that litigation is very complex. Transparency can 
reduce the number of visits to the courthouse and can also let 
ordinary citizens believe more in the justice system,” 
commented Zhang, a young woman caught in a family 
dispute.235 Two other women expressed similar opinions.236 The 
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move towards online disclosure also “prevents corruption”237 
and guards against “black box operations.”238 “In the past,” said 
Li, an elderly man facing a contractual dispute, “the government 
had a spear in their left hand and a shield in their right hand. No 
matter how, the government is always in the right. But now, with 
openness, ordinary citizens knowing the situation can monitor 
[the courts] and judges can also ensure they improve their 
efficiency and quality .”239 Wang, who was dismissed by her 
company on a pretext after falling pregnant, also had positive 
reactions. “When ordinary citizens like me run into these kinds 
of legal problems, people in the work unit will frighten me by 
telling me they have social guanxi, they have guanxi in the courts, 
they have guanxi in the arbitral tribunals, they have a legal team. 
But if there is openness, then it’s very good because next time 
they cannot use this to fool with me.”240 The preceding ideas are, 
perhaps, best summarized by Zhou:  
This [development] is very good. The first 
point is that it increases public confidence. 
Courts serve ordinary citizens and, being 
open, can be inspected by them. The second 
aspect is that everyone must learn. Openness 
is a very good mode of passing down 
knowledge. We must know the law, obey the 
law, and learn the law. Only then can the law 
protect us. 
But some legal aid seekers entertained doubts about how things 
operate in practice. “This is a long process, basically impossible,” 
said Xia, a middle-aged man.241 “For example there are some 
cases that cannot be disclosed, there are some [judgments] that 
will not be enforced. Disclosure is conditional,” he continued. 
“The slogan ‘rule the country through law’ has been hollered for 
twenty years but things are still like that, isn’t that so?” Tai too 
distrusted official narratives. “There has to be hearings and 
deliberations, there has to be collaborative discussion, mutual 
monitoring for there to be an impact,” said the litigant who has 
pursued his administrative suit for 8 years through petitions and 
appeals. “Courts are rigged from start to finish.”  
Interviewees were fractured on the necessity of procuring 
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legal services once a complaint has been automatically drafted 
by a computer. Out of the 111 legal aid seekers who responded 
to this question, 43 would still hire a lawyer, 28 would not,242 
and 40 said that it depended on the circumstances. Among 
respondents who would not retain a lawyer, 10 expressed 
confidence in handling their own cases and 12 raised financial 
considerations. These reasons are, of course, not mutually 
exclusive. “Hiring a lawyer requires money. I don’t think I will 
hire a lawyer—I will go to court myself,” stated Chen, an elderly 
man looking for assistance on an inheritance issue. “It not only 
trains my abilities—it is also a learning opportunity. Originally, 
I was ignorant but over the last few years I have acquired some 
legal knowledge.”243 “If the software is useful,” said Tao, “I 
won’t look for a lawyer.” “Once they open their mouths, they 
will be asking for 5000 yuan.” 244  A few also articulated an 
equivalency between humans and machines. According to Luo, 
a 74-year-old woman mulling a charge of filial neglect, 
“software more or less counts as a lawyer.” “They are actually 
the same, only that [software] is free and serves us.”245  
Legal aid seekers who would nonetheless hire a lawyer 
believed attorneys to be more holistic and adaptable in their 
thinking than computers and more technically competent than 
themselves. These interviewees expressed reservations about the 
limits of technology, on the one hand, and their own ability to 
prosecute arguments on the other. “I would guess that the 
software is still not comprehensive,” pondered Yuan. “[T]he 
software’s knowledge is rigid. [Whereas] I believe that the legal 
determination should be based on the actual situation. [The 
eventual disposition] must accord with sentiment, reason, and 
law. So, I will still hire a lawyer.” 246  Close to a dozen 
interviewees also emphasized the importance of personal 
interactions. Exclaimed Wang, a 40-year-old woman pursuing a 
labor claim: “I will [hire a lawyer], of course! One helps you to 
write things up without meeting you, one is face-to-face. Of 
course, I will believe the face-to-face, the lawyer I find myself, 
face-to-face.”247    
Among many interviewees who gave qualified answers, 
the ultimate decision whether to retain a legal professional in any 
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given case turned on the complexity of the matter and the amount 
at stake. The following responses are illustrative. “If I am unable 
to get the case accepted,” said a university student researching 
on behalf of a relative, “I will hire a lawyer for guidance. But if 
I am able to get the case accepted, then I won’t. Moreover, it 
depends on the case. There is no need for a lawyer in an obvious 
case, only in an unclear one.”248 For Ding, a middle-aged man 
caught up in a contractual disagreement, any decision “will have 
to depend on the dispute.” “Take my case. It’s worth at most 
6000 yuan. If I hire a lawyer, the amount I recover from the 
lawsuit won’t even be enough to buy the water purifier [in this 
legal aid clinic].”249 To Yang，a middle-aged woman embroiled 
in a domestic dispute, case type also matters. “In the case of a 
family matter, the parties are better acquainted with the 
underlying facts and circumstances than the lawyer. But if the 
dispute is more technical in nature, implicating for example 
intellectual property, then I will engage a lawyer.”250   
Unsurprisingly, interviewees were also divided on the 
reliability of artificial as opposed to human predictions. In the 
event of conflicting advice regarding case outcomes, 20 
interviewees would trust the algorithm and 49 the attorney. 34 
indicated were uncertain. 10 of those favoring human judgment 
cited the lawyer’s ability to think integrally. For example, Wang, 
a 40-year-old woman engaged in a labor grievance, declared 
unequivocally for the lawyer. “Software is only just software. A 
lawyer will consider things for me more comprehensively.”251 
He, a man in his mid-40s, “will believe the lawyer because the 
lawyer will point out issues forthrightly. Moreover, what the 
software says is not all that accurate. It will let you choose A [or] 
B, then provide you a reference. I feel the lawyer is more 
convincing and a little safer.”252 Presence and interactivity also 
matter. Xu, a young woman, finds professional legal advice to 
be more credible because “the lawyer is two-way and 
communicates.” “Software is, after all, one-way.” Sharing this 
intuition, Cai, a labor disputant, said he was “more willing to 
believe the lawyer.” “Software cannot be seen and cannot be 
touched. A lawyer is a real person sitting here. This is my 
personal feeling.” 
A substantial minority, however, preferred artificial 
judgment. Underlying this sentiment, for some interviewees, is 
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a general suspicion of the legal profession. “A lawyer is not 
necessarily an expert in the field of my case and may not be 
professional enough. I feel that software is a little more 
dependable,” Meng, a middle-aged woman. 253  “Software 
removes many human factors,” asserted Zhang, who shares 
Meng’s demographics. Chen, a young woman, also perceived 
machines as “being more objective.” Attorneys “can be bought” 
and may play both sides, “devouring the plaintiff [before] 
devouring the defendant.”254 Interestingly, one legal aid seeker 
juxtaposed the public nature of software and the private 
incentives of lawyers. “I believe the software! It is definitely 
reliable,” affirmed Zhu, a middle-aged man involved in a traffic 
accident. “This software is released for everyone to use. 
Everyone can observe this matter, discuss this question. The eyes 
of the masses are bright as snow. Although a lawyer burns [the 
client’s] money, he thinks more for himself.”255 Another legal 
aid seeker emphasized the provenance of the algorithm. “I 
believe the software,” said Qiang, an elderly woman navigating 
a family dispute, “because the software is developed by the state 
whereas the lawyer[’s opinion] is personal.” “Because the 
software must have been approved by the state, I feel it will be a 
little fairer. In fact, I need this [software] now because I have no 
money. If it’s free, I will be willing to use it now.”256 
 
C.   Normative Implications 
 
These empirical findings hint at the possibilities—and 
limits—of technology in relieving some of the central tensions 
in Chinese justice. Although the contribution of automated 
transcribers and robot clerks to judicial efficiency remains to be 
seen, mass digitization and disclosure has the potential to 
enhance the public image of the courts. Among both internet 
users and legal aid seekers, the availability of court documents 
online is widely known and broadly welcomed. While some 
remain unpersuaded that things on the ground will truly change, 
a good number praised transparency as an antidote to judicial 
corruption and ineptitude. The exposure of judicial procedures 
and outcomes to public scrutiny may thus convince disputants to 
resolve matters in court even when they have nagging doubts 
about the quality of the bench. It thereby encourages resort to 
law while tempering demands for ever greater stringency in the 
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selection and training of judges.  
But the mass publication of judicial decisions does not 
only discipline judicial behavior. It also teaches the public how 
the law operates in real-life situations and numerous legal aid 
seekers have either consulted or intend to search for judgments 
on the internet. Besides databases and repositories, a multitude 
of online applications, private and official, seek to educate 
disputants about their rights and how to assert them. 
Approximately half of all netizens surveyed had availed 
themselves of these litigation services. And Chinese courts today 
help initiate cases in addition to deciding them. While artificial 
intelligence will not produce law without lawyers—many legal 
aid seekers interviewed would engage an attorney even if a 
complaint has been generated for them—empowering litigants 
to press their own suits reduces their dependence on others. In 
particular, the fact that some legal aid seekers would forgo 
professional advice in favor of self-help suggests that 
technology, while promoting access to justice, simultaneously 
diminishes the role of lawyers as community organizers and 
changemakers.  
Finally, predictive software furnished by the judiciary 
could very well sway disputants away from combative justice 
towards mediated peace. Here again, our investigations show 
human counsel is frequently preferred to algorithmic advice. But 
about one quarter of netizens and a fifth of legal aid seekers who 
contemplated our hypothetical would unqualifiedly believe the 
computer over a lawyer. The former is perceived as more 
dispassionate than the latter and less susceptible to the kind of 
self-motivated biases that taint human judgment. By citing 
relevant authorities and giving a forecast of the merits, litigation 
guidance machines installed across the nation’s courthouses 
might persuade some litigants to settle ostensibly unsound 
claims rather than doggedly pursue their grievances to the bitter 
end. Crucially, they do so not by browbeating the parties into 
acquiescence but by dousing their expectations of legal success. 
Conveying at least the impression of scientific objectivity, 
artificial intelligence promotes social harmony without 




China has made no secret of its ambition is to transform 
its society and economy through technology. In 2017, the State 
Council articulated a national strategy for making China a global 
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leader in artificial intelligence.257 By 2030, the “New Generation 
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” announces, China will 
emerge as a global innovation center for artificial intelligence, 
boasting a trillion-yuan industry. The culmination of a sustained 
interest in exploiting artificial intelligence to further the central 
state’s policy goals, the Plan declares investment in the 
technology to be “a major strategy to enhance national 
competitiveness and protect national security.” Through the 
development of artificial intelligence, China hopes to sharpen its 
military capabilities, galvanize its economy, and improve the 
provision and delivery of public services. From this perspective, 
the changes overtaking the juridical sphere are one part of a 
larger strategy for propelling the nation into the digital age and 
onto the world stage.258 But the technologization of the legal 
system also responds to oppositions in Chinese justice. Some 
tensions are the product of China’s historical contingencies. 
Others might be thought to be more fundamental in nature given 
China’s brand of socialist law. While encouraging citizens to 
vindicate their legitimate rights, the Party-State is wary of legal 
mobilization that subverts its hegemony. Whether deliberate or 
organic, Chinese legal technology—we venture—has evolved to 
answer these dilemmas.  
To conclude, there is an insight here that transcends 
jurisdictional boundaries and legal cultures. According to Cui 
Yadong, President and Chief Justice of the Shanghai High 
People’s Court, “artificial intelligence makes the court system 
more just, efficient and authoritative.”259 This narrative portrays 
the technologization of the justice as its perfection.260 Technical 
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capabilities advance but the aspirations of the law are universal 
and enduring. From this perspective, artificial intelligence 
promises broad access to justice, speedy adjudication, 
consistency in legal outcomes, and judicial accountability. Smart 
courts are like their predecessors—only better. Certainly, it is 
desirable for the rule of law that judicial decisions be made freely 
available to the public and for citizens to know and vindicate 
their legal rights. The obverse of the democratization of law, 
however, is the marginalization of the legal profession. The more 
people can navigate the legal process, the less they need lawyers 
to mediate between them and the justice system. The advent of 
technology thus surfaces a tension between two dimensions of 
legality. 261  The first dimension sees law as the abiding 
“enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules.” 262  To engender and re-produce social order, a legal 
system must satisfy a list of conditions. Among other things, 
rules must be public and remedies available to all. The second 
dimension, on the other hand, conceives of law as a dynamic 
force that, by responding to reason, 263  has the potential to 
reshape the normative status quo.264 There is no deep theoretical 
contradiction between these visions of law. But to the extent that 
lawyers are integral to the vitality of the legal order, innovations 
that displace them may also undermine one conception of the 
rule of law.  
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